linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

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Message-ID: <CAG48ez3x9HSkLZc-da6zjPbckyfdPvwyQa3p9P6EzQ5sGk53eg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 3 Jun 2018 20:41:01 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     tycho@...ho.ws
Cc:     kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, christian.brauner@...ntu.com,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...onical.com>,
        suda.akihiro@....ntt.co.jp, "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Sun, Jun 3, 2018 at 2:29 PM Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws> wrote:
>
> This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify
> some other task that a particular filter has been triggered.
>
> The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example,
> if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this
> untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel
> anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module
> the container is trying to load and load it on the host.
>
> As another example, containers cannot mknod(), since this checks
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, harmless devices like /dev/null or
> /dev/zero should be ok for containers to mknod, but we'd like to avoid hard
> coding some whitelist in the kernel. Another example is mount(), which has
> many security restrictions for good reason, but configuration or runtime
> knowledge could potentially be used to relax these restrictions.
>
> This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two
> other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one
> could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL.
> Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a
> filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP.
> Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that
> tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not
> be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older
> distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace,
> since upstart itself uses ptrace to start services.
>
> The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
> synchronization right was/is slightly complex.
>
> Finally, it's worth noting that the classic seccomp TOCTOU of reading
> memory data from the task still applies here, but can be avoided with
> careful design of the userspace handler: if the userspace handler reads all
> of the task memory that is necessary before applying its security policy,
> the tracee's subsequent memory edits will not be read by the tracer.
[...]
> @@ -857,13 +1020,28 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
>         if (IS_ERR(prepared))
>                 return PTR_ERR(prepared);
>
> +       if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER) {
> +               listener = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDWR);

I think you want either 0 or O_CLOEXEC here?

> +out_put_fd:
> +       if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_GET_LISTENER) {
> +               if (ret < 0) {
> +                       fput(listener_f);
> +                       put_unused_fd(listener);
> +               } else {
> +                       fd_install(listener, listener_f);
> +                       ret = listener;
> +               }
> +       }
>  out_free:
>         seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
>         return ret;
[...]
> +static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file,
> +                                   struct poll_table_struct *poll_tab)
> +{
> +       struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> +       __poll_t ret = 0;
> +       struct seccomp_knotif *cur;
> +
> +       ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
> +       if (ret < 0)
> +               return ret;
> +
> +       list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notifications, list) {
> +               if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT)
> +                       ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
> +               if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
> +                       ret |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
> +       }
> +
> +       mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> +       return ret;
> +}

I don't think f_op->poll handlers work like this. AFAIK you're
supposed to use something like poll_wait() to connect the caller to
something like a waitqueue head, so that as soon as the file becomes
ready for reading/writing, any waiting task is notified. See
eventfd_poll() in fs/eventfd.c for a simple example. AFAICS in the
current code, seccomp_notify_poll() only works if an event is pending
at the time seccomp_notify_poll() is called.