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Message-ID: <67d8a813-b46a-d1da-3897-c38dd5b46b8e@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 10:55:04 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
mike.kravetz@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
On 06/07/2018 10:46 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Also, did you add all the needed checks to make get_user_pages(),
>> access_process_vm(), etc fail when called on the shadow stack? (Or at
>> least fail if they're requesting write access and the FORCE bit isn't
>> set.)
> Currently if FORCE bit is set, these functions can write to shadow
> stack, otherwise write access will fail. I will test it.
Is this a part of your selftests/ for this feature?
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