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Message-ID: <22ccde18-6175-fc57-d1a3-06140b419116@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 13:17:20 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
mike.kravetz@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/10] x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack
On 06/07/2018 01:12 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>>> +int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp)
>>> +{
>>> + if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
>>> + return 0;
>>> + return cet_set_shstk_ptr(ssp);
>>> +}
>> This will blow up if the shadow stack enabled state changes in a
>> signal handler. Maybe we don't care.
> Yes, the task will get a control protection fault.
Sounds like something to add to the very long list of things that are
unwise to do in a signal handler. Great manpage fodder.
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