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Message-ID: <20180612105011.GA26931@amd>
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 12:50:12 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
dave.hansen@...el.com, sean.j.christopherson@...el.com,
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Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"open list:INTEL SGX" <intel-sgx-kernel-dev@...ts.01.org>,
Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
"open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR X86 (KVM/x86)"
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>,
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"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
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Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support
On Fri 2018-06-08 19:09:35, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications
> to set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave
> is disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access
> control. In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It
> protects the application from a malicious host.
Do you intend to allow non-root applications to use SGX?
What are non-evil uses for SGX?
...because it is quite useful for some kinds of evil:
https://taesoo.kim/pubs/2017/jang:sgx-bomb.pdf
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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