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Message-ID: <63b7e88f-33d6-c5c1-f6cb-1bbb780e2cc4@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 10:51:50 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 03/17] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs
On 06/12/2018 07:39 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Pages encrypted with different encryption keys are not subject to KSM
> merge. Otherwise it would cross security boundary.
This needs a much stronger explanation. Which KeyID would be used for
access in the new direct mappings? What actually happens without this
patch in place?
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