linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.17 06/45] kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions

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Message-Id: <20180614132127.115323659@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 14 Jun 2018 16:03:57 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@...gle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.17 06/45] kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions

4.17-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@...gle.com>

commit 727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 upstream.

VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.

Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -7670,6 +7670,12 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	/* CPL=0 must be checked manually. */
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (vmx->nested.vmxon) {
 		nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT_OPERATION);
 		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
@@ -7729,6 +7735,11 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *
  */
 static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
 		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
 		return 0;
@@ -8029,7 +8040,7 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu
 		if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
 				vmx_instruction_info, true, &gva))
 			return 1;
-		/* _system ok, as hardware has verified cpl=0 */
+		/* _system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
 		kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva,
 			     &field_value, (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), NULL);
 	}
@@ -8189,7 +8200,7 @@ static int handle_vmptrst(struct kvm_vcp
 	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
 			vmx_instruction_info, true, &vmcs_gva))
 		return 1;
-	/* ok to use *_system, as hardware has verified cpl=0 */
+	/* *_system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
 	if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, vmcs_gva,
 				 (void *)&to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmptr,
 				 sizeof(u64), &e)) {