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Message-ID: <821642fe-775b-e68c-2a66-73b73c810289@suse.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 08:30:22 +0200
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Mike Latimer <mlatimer@...e.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/pti: don't report XenPV as vulnerable
On 15/06/18 08:16, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 15 Jun 2018, Juergen Gross wrote:
>
>>>> wrong for 64-bit, too, in case the mitigation is disabled at hypervisor
>>>> level.
>>>
>>> If that is indeed possible (is it?), then the check we have in
>>> pti_check_boottime_disable() is wrong as well.
>>
>> No, it isn't. PTI for 32-bit kernels isn't paravirtualized, so it has to
>> be disabled.
>
> I was talking about this "mitigation disabled at Xen hypervisor level for
> 64-bit" situation though.
>
Why? PTI has to be disabled in PV guests as it can't work there due to
missing paravirtualization of the PTI feature (mov to/from %cr3).
The Xen meltdown mitigation ("XPTI") for 64-bit pv guests is primarily
securing the hypervisor against meltdown attacks of the guest. The guest
itself can't do anything in this regard in 64-bit mode, as user and
kernel code are already using different %cr3 values even without PTI.
Juergen
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