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Message-ID: <CAM_iQpUYWzxMDgJJazLwvD1Tx_7i4PRC0r+2JKar3Vr4bW-Q+w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Fri, 15 Jun 2018 10:57:49 -0700
From:   Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
To:     Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...lanox.com>
Cc:     Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
        Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] infiniband: fix a subtle race condition

On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 7:57 PM, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...lanox.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 04:14:13PM -0700, Cong Wang wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 10:24 AM, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...lanox.com> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 10:03:09AM -0700, Cong Wang wrote:
>> >> On Thu, Jun 14, 2018 at 7:24 AM, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...lanox.com> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > This was my brief reaction too, this code path almost certainly has a
>> >> > use-after-free, and we should fix the concurrency between the two
>> >> > places in some correct way..
>> >>
>> >> First of all, why use-after-free could trigger an imbalance unlock?
>> >> IOW, why do we have to solve use-after-free to fix this imbalance
>> >> unlock?
>> >
>> > The issue syzkaller hit is that accessing ctx->file does not seem
>> > locked in any way and can race with other manipulations of ctx->file.
>> >
>> > So.. for this patch to be correct we need to understand how this
>> > statement:
>> >
>> >    f = ctx->file
>> >
>> > Avoids f becoming a dangling pointer - and without locking, my
>>
>> It doesn't, because this is not the point, this is not the cause
>> of the unlock imbalance either. syzbot didn't report use-after-free
>> or a kernel segfault here.
>
> No, it *is* the point - you've proposed a solution, one of many, and
> we need to see an actual sensible design for how the locking around
> ctx->file should work correctly.

I proposed to a solution for imbalance unlock, you ask a design
for use-after-free, which is *irrelevant*. So why it is the point?


>
> We need solutions that solve the underlying problem, not just paper
> over the symptoms.


Sure, but your underlying problem exists before my patch, and it
is _not_ the cause of the imbalance unlock. Why does my patch
have an obligation to fix an irrelevant bug??

Since when we need to fix two bugs in one patch when it only aims
to fix one??

>
> Stated another way, for a syzkaller report like this there are a few
> really obvious fixes.
>
> 1) Capture the lock pointer on the stack:
>   f = ctx->file
>   mutex_lock(&f->mut);
>   mutex_unlock(&f->mut);

This is my patch.

>
> 2) Prevent ctx->file from changing, eg add more locking:
>   mutex_lock(&mut);
>   mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut);
>   mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut));
>   mutex_unlock(&mut);


Obvious deadlock.


>
> 3) Prevent ctx->file from being changing/freed by flushing the
>    WQ at the right times:
>
>    rdma_addr_cancel(...);
>    ctx->file = XYZ;
>

Let's me REPEAT for a 3rd time: *Irrelevant*. Can you hear me?



> This patch proposed #1. An explanation is required why that is a
> correct locking design for this code. It sure looks like it isn't.


Ask yourself: does _my_ patch ever change any locking?
If you agree it is not, then you don't have any point to blame
locking on it.

I am _not_ against your redesign of locking, but you really have
to provide a separate patch for it, because it is a _different_ bug.


>
> Looking at this *just a bit*, I wonder why not do something like
> this:
>
>   mutex_lock(&mut);
>   f = ctx->file;
>   mutex_lock(&f->mutex);
>   mutex_unlock(&mut);
>
> ? At least that *might* make sense. Though probably it deadlocks as it
> looks like we call rdma_addr_cancel() while holding mut. Yuk.


Since you know it is deadlock, why even bring it up?


>
> But maybe that sequence could be done before launching the work..
>
>> > I'm not sure that race exists, there should be something that flushes
>> > the WQ on the path to close... (though I have another email that
>> > perhaps that is broken, sigh)
>>
>> This is not related to my patch, but to convince you, let me explain:
>>
>> struct ucma_file is not refcnt'ed, I know you cancel the work in
>> rdma_destroy_id(), but after ucma_migrate_id() the ctx has already
>> been moved to the new file, for the old file, it won't cancel the
>> ctx flying with workqueue. So, I think the following use-after-free
>> could happen:
>>
>> ucma_event_handler():
>> cur_file = ctx->file; // old file
>>
>> ucma_migrate_id():
>> lock();
>> list_move_tail(&ctx->list, &new_file->ctx_list);
>> ctx->file = new_file;
>> unlock();
>>
>> ucma_close():
>> // retrieve old file via filp->private_data
>> // the loop won't cover the ctx moved to the new_file
>> kfree(file);
>
> Yep. That sure seems like the right analysis!
>
>> This is _not_ the cause of the unlock imbalance, and is _not_ expected
>> to solve by patch either.
>
> What do you mean? Not calling rdma_addr_cancel() prior to freeing the
> file is *exactly* the cause of the lock imbalance.

Please do yourself a favor:

RUN THE REPRODUCER

See if you can still trigger imbalance with my patch which apparently
doesn't fix any use-after-free. You don't trust me, can you trust the
reproducer?


>
> The design of this code *assumes* that rdma_addr_cancel() will be
> called before altering/freeing/etc any of the state it is working on,
> migration makes a state change that violates that invariant.
>

I agree with you, but again, why do you think it is the cause
of imbalance unlock?

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