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Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1806152304400.6203@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 23:10:05 +0200 (CEST)
From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Mike Latimer <mlatimer@...e.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/pti: don't report XenPV as vulnerable
On Fri, 15 Jun 2018, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Like it is possible to switch off PTI in the kernel it is possible to do
> the same with XPTI in the hypervisor (it is even possible to disable
> XPTI for dom0 only).
>
> In case XPTI is disabled for the currently running system it is possible
> to make use of Meltdown in user programs to read arbitrary physical host
> memory (i.e. attacking the hypervisor) and this includes the own systems
> kernel memory.
>
> So telling a user the system isn't vulnerable regarding Meltdown when
> running as 64-bit pv-guest might not be the truth.
Ok, what a mess.
As I don't think it'd be wise to try to let guest kernel figure out
whether host has XPTI, I'd suggest at least making the message somehow
more informative. Something like
+ if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required\n");
perhaps?
Thanks,
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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