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Message-Id: <20180618080618.376827758@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 10:13:36 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>,
Francis Deslauriers <francis.deslauriers@...icios.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.16 231/279] kprobes/x86: Prohibit probing on exception masking instructions
4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
[ Upstream commit ee6a7354a3629f9b65bc18dbe393503e9440d6f5 ]
Since MOV SS and POP SS instructions will delay the exceptions until the
next instruction is executed, single-stepping on it by kprobes must be
prohibited.
However, kprobes usually executes those instructions directly on trampoline
buffer (a.k.a. kprobe-booster), except for the kprobes which has
post_handler. Thus if kprobe user probes MOV SS with post_handler, it will
do single-stepping on the MOV SS.
This means it is safe that if it is used via ftrace or perf/bpf since those
don't use the post_handler.
Anyway, since the stack switching is a rare case, it is safer just
rejecting kprobes on such instructions.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Francis Deslauriers <francis.deslauriers@...icios.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/152587069574.17316.3311695234863248641.stgit@devbox
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
@@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(
return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes;
}
+#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f
+#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e
+
+/*
+ * Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states;
+ * "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS
+ * instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is
+ * suppressed."
+ * This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these
+ * instructions, single stepping is suppressed.
+ */
+static inline int insn_masking_exception(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == POP_SS_OPCODE ||
+ (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == MOV_SREG_OPCODE &&
+ X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.bytes[0]) == 2);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src
if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
return 0;
+ /* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */
+ if (insn_masking_exception(insn))
+ return 0;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Only x86_64 has RIP relative instructions */
if (insn_rip_relative(insn)) {
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