linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: mark tramp_pg

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Message-ID: <20180619155001.GP13984@arm.com>
Date:   Tue, 19 Jun 2018 16:50:01 +0100
From:   Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
Cc:     YaoJun <yaojun8558363@...il.com>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: mark tramp_pg_dir read-only

On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 05:40:26PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 19 June 2018 at 17:37, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 05:29:03PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 19 June 2018 at 17:28, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> wrote:
> >> > On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 05:23:41PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> >> On 19 June 2018 at 17:20, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> wrote:
> >> >> > Hi Ard,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Sorry, I forgot to reply to this.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 11:53:20AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> >> >> On 30 May 2018 at 11:14, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com> wrote:
> >> >> >> > On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 12:48:06PM +0800, YaoJun wrote:
> >> >> >> >> To protect against KSMA(Kernel Space Mirroring Attack), make
> >> >> >> >> tramp_pg_dir read-only. The principle of KSMA is to insert a
> >> >> >> >> carefully constructed PGD entry into the translation table.
> >> >> >> >> The type of this entry is block, which maps the kernel text
> >> >> >> >> and its access permissions bits are 01. The user process can
> >> >> >> >> then modify kernel text directly through this mapping. In this
> >> >> >> >> way, an arbitrary write can be converted to multiple arbitrary
> >> >> >> >> writes.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> Signed-off-by: YaoJun <yaojun8558363@...il.com>
> >> >> >> >> ---
> >> >> >> >>  arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 4 ++++
> >> >> >> >>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> >> >> >> >> index 2dbb2c9f1ec1..ac4b22c7e435 100644
> >> >> >> >> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> >> >> >> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> >> >> >> >> @@ -551,6 +551,10 @@ static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void)
> >> >> >> >>       __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE,
> >> >> >> >>                            prot, pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0);
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> +     update_mapping_prot(__pa_symbol(tramp_pg_dir),
> >> >> >> >> +                             (unsigned long)tramp_pg_dir,
> >> >> >> >> +                             PGD_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Hmm, I like the idea but is there a risk that the page table has been mapped
> >> >> >> > as part of a block entry, which we can't safely split at this point (i.e.
> >> >> >> > we'll run into one of the BUG_ONs in the mapping code)?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> We'd need to create a separate segment for it initially so the mapping
> >> >> >> is already at the right granularity.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Why do you think that's the case? I can't see anything that guarantees this
> >> >> > for the page table itself.
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> We'd need to pass NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS to map_kernel_segment(),
> >> >> obviously, but that shouldn't hurt since that segment is relatively
> >> >> tiny anyway.
> >> >
> >> > Ah right, with NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS, I agree that we're good.
> >> > Ideally, we'd move {idmap,swapper,tramp}_pg_dir into .rodata...
> >> >
> >>
> >> idmap and tramp yes, but swapper needs to be modifiable at runtime, no?
> >
> > Right, but couldn't we swizzle the permissions in e.g. set_pmd? We could
> > even predicate that on a sanity check of the prot.
> >
> 
> Swizzle the permissions of the entire .rodata segment? That sounds
> doable, but there is a whole class of data that belongs in this
> category, and I think PaX/grsecurity had an API for that (but I don't
> think anyone is upstreaming that yet). So let's not reinvent that
> wheel for swapper_pg_dir only.

I wasn't thinking of the whole .rodata segment -- just the page containing
the entry being modified, but ok. I was hoping to avoid getting involved
with the PaX/grsec stuff as it seems rather toxic from what I've seen.

Will