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Message-ID: <20180620123905.348181b2@canb.auug.org.au>
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2018 12:39:05 +1000
From: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Linux-Next Mailing List <linux-next@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the userns tree with the vfs tree
Hi all,
Today's linux-next merge of the userns tree got a conflict in:
fs/proc/inode.c
fs/proc/root.c
between commit:
0223e0999be2 ("procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c")
83cd45075c36 ("proc: Add fs_context support to procfs")
from the vfs tree and commit:
cc8cda3af2ba ("proc: Simplify and fix proc by removing the kernel mount")
9303f5f81bd4 ("proc: Change proc_parse_options to return an errno value")
04035aa33a12 ("proc: Don't change mount options on remount failure.")
from the userns tree.
I effectively reverted 9303f5f81bd4 and 04035aa33a12 since (I think)
they are subsumed by the vfs tree changes.
I fixed it up (I think I got it mostly right this time - see below) and
can carry the fix as necessary. This is now fixed as far as linux-next
is concerned, but any non trivial conflicts should be mentioned to your
upstream maintainer when your tree is submitted for merging. You may
also want to consider cooperating with the maintainer of the
conflicting tree to minimise any particularly complex conflicts.
--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell
diff --cc fs/proc/root.c
index efbdc08a3c86,3dceff6cd121..91e9b417bc6d
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@@ -80,71 -78,21 +80,74 @@@ static int proc_parse_option(struct fs_
return 0;
}
-int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
+static void proc_set_options(struct super_block *s,
+ struct fs_context *fc,
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
- struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
- struct proc_mount_options opts = {
- .pid_gid = pid->pid_gid,
- .hide_pid = pid->hide_pid,
- };
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
+
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid))
+ pid_ns->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid))
+ pid_ns->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
+}
+
+static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = get_pid_ns(s->s_fs_info);
+ struct inode *root_inode;
int ret;
- sync_filesystem(sb);
- ret = proc_parse_options(data, &opts);
- if (ret)
+ proc_set_options(s, fc, pid_ns, current_user_ns());
+
+ /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
+ s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
+ s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
+ s->s_blocksize = 1024;
+ s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
+ s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ s->s_op = &proc_sops;
+ s->s_time_gran = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
+ * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
+ * top of it
+ */
+ s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
+
+ pde_get(&proc_root);
+ root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
+ if (!root_inode) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
+ if (!s->s_root) {
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = proc_setup_self(s);
+ if (ret) {
return ret;
- pid->pid_gid = opts.pid_gid;
- pid->hide_pid = opts.hide_pid;
+ }
- return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
++ ret = proc_setup_thread_self(s);
++
++ rcu_assign_pointer(pid_ns->proc_super, s);
++ return ret;
+}
+
+int proc_reconfigure(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
+
+ sync_filesystem(sb);
+
+ if (fc)
+ proc_set_options(sb, fc, pid, current_user_ns());
return 0;
}
@@@ -288,44 -208,23 +292,22 @@@ struct proc_dir_entry proc_root =
.proc_fops = &proc_root_operations,
.parent = &proc_root,
.subdir = RB_ROOT,
- .name = proc_root.inline_name,
- .inline_name = "/proc",
+ .name = "/proc",
};
- int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL) || defined(CONFIG_MCONSOLE)
+ struct file *file_open_proc(const char *pathname, int flags, umode_t mode)
{
- struct proc_fs_context *ctx;
- struct fs_context *fc;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
- int ret;
-
- fc = vfs_new_fs_context(&proc_fs_type, NULL, 0,
- FS_CONTEXT_FOR_KERNEL_MOUNT);
- if (IS_ERR(fc))
- return PTR_ERR(fc);
-
- ctx = fc->fs_private;
- if (ctx->pid_ns != ns) {
- put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
- get_pid_ns(ns);
- ctx->pid_ns = ns;
- }
+ struct file *file;
- ret = vfs_get_tree(fc);
- if (ret < 0) {
- put_fs_context(fc);
- return ret;
- }
-
- mnt = vfs_create_mount(fc, 0);
- put_fs_context(fc);
+ mnt = kern_mount(&proc_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(mnt))
- return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+ return ERR_CAST(mnt);
- ns->proc_mnt = mnt;
- return 0;
- }
+ file = file_open_root(mnt->mnt_root, mnt, pathname, flags, mode);
+ kern_unmount(mnt);
- void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
- {
- kern_unmount(ns->proc_mnt);
+ return file;
}
+ #endif
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