Message-Id: <0e457dc23d97f272476b47d1a8e3dccf7c4c1695.1529486870.git.yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 20 Jun 2018 17:39:54 +0800
From:   Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
To:     "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>
Cc:     "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3][RFC] PM / Hibernate: Add helper functions for hibernation encryption

Basically, this solution is to encrypt the pages before
they go to the block device.

There was a discussion on the mailing list on whether
the key should be derived in kernel or in user space.
And it turns out to be generating the key by user space
is more applicable[1]. So the procedure is illustrated below:

1. The user space reads the salt from kernel and
   generates a symmetrical (AES) key based on user
   passphrase. Then the kernel uses that key to
   encrypt the hibernation image.
2. The salt will be saved in image header and passed to
   the restore kernel.
3. During restore, the userspace reads the salt
   from the kernel and probe passphrase from the user
   to generate the same key and pass that key back to kernel.
4. The restore kernel uses that key to decrypt the image.

Generally the advantage is: Users do not have to
encrypt the whole swap partition as other tools.
After all, ideally kernel memory should be encrypted
by the kernel itself.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html

Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>
Cc: linux-pm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
---
 kernel/power/Kconfig              |  13 ++
 kernel/power/Makefile             |   1 +
 kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/power/power.h              |  37 ++++
 4 files changed, 456 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c

diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
index e880ca2..9a23572 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
@@ -101,6 +101,19 @@ config PM_STD_PARTITION
 	  suspended image to. It will simply pick the first available swap 
 	  device.
 
+config CRYPTO_HIBERNATION
+	tristate "Encryption of snapshot for hibernation"
+	depends on HIBERNATION && CRYPTO_AES && KEYS
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow the kernel to encrypt the snapshot data based on
+	  user provided passphrase. The user should provide a valid
+	  symmetrical key to the kernel via ioctl, so the kernel
+	  will use that key to encrypt the hibernation snapshot pages.
+	  A typical tool can be found under tools/power/crypto/.
+
+	  If in doubt, say N.
+
 config PM_SLEEP
 	def_bool y
 	depends on SUSPEND || HIBERNATE_CALLBACKS
diff --git a/kernel/power/Makefile b/kernel/power/Makefile
index a3f79f0e..52c68a4 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/power/Makefile
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FREEZER)		+= process.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND)		+= suspend.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_TEST_SUSPEND)	+= suspend_test.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION)	+= hibernate.o snapshot.o swap.o user.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HIBERNATION) += crypto_hibernation.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP)	+= autosleep.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS)	+= wakelock.o
 
diff --git a/kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c b/kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5703cce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/power/crypto_hibernation.c
+ *
+ * This file provides in-kernel encrypted hibernation support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
+ *
+ * Basically, this solution encrypts the pages before they go to
+ * the block device, the procedure is illustrated below:
+ * 1. The user space reads the salt from the kernel, generates
+ *    a symmetrical (AES)key, the kernel uses that key to encrypt the
+ *    hibernation image.
+ * 2. The salt is saved in image header and passed to
+ *    the restore kernel.
+ * 3. During restore, the userspace needs to read the salt
+ *    from the kernel and probe passphrase from the user
+ *    to generate the key and pass that key back to kernel.
+ * 4. The restore kernel uses that key to decrypt the image.
+ *
+ * Generally the advantage is: Users DO NOT have to
+ * encrypt the whole swap partition as other tools.
+ * After all, ideally kernel memory should be encrypted
+ * by the kernel itself.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PM: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include "power.h"
+
+static int crypto_data(const char *inbuf,
+			    int inlen,
+			    char *outbuf,
+			    int outlen,
+			    bool encrypt,
+			    int page_idx);
+static void crypto_save(void *buf);
+static void crypto_restore(void *buf);
+static int crypto_init(bool suspend);
+
+/* help function hooks */
+static struct hibernation_crypto hib_crypto = {
+	.crypto_data = crypto_data,
+	.save = crypto_save,
+	.restore = crypto_restore,
+	.init = crypto_init,
+};
+
+/* return the key value. */
+static char *get_key_ptr(void)
+{
+	return hib_crypto.keys.derived_key;
+}
+
+/* return the salt value. */
+static char *get_salt_ptr(void)
+{
+	return hib_crypto.keys.salt;
+}
+
+/**
+ * crypto_data() - en/decrypt the data
+ * @inbuf: the source buffer
+ * @inlen: the length of source buffer
+ * @outbuf: the dest buffer
+ * @outlen: the length of dest buffer
+ * @encrypt: encrypt or decrypt
+ * @page_idx: the index of that page been manipulated
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, non-zero for other cases.
+ *
+ * Better use SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK to support multi-thread
+ * encryption, however hibernation does not support multi-threaded
+ * swap page write out due to the fact that the swap_map has to be
+ * accessed sequently.
+ */
+static int crypto_data(const char *inbuf,
+			    int inlen,
+			    char *outbuf,
+			    int outlen,
+			    bool encrypt,
+			    int page_idx)
+{
+	struct scatterlist src, dst;
+	int ret;
+	struct {
+		__le64 idx;
+		u8 padding[HIBERNATE_IV_SIZE - sizeof(__le64)];
+	} iv;
+
+	iv.idx = cpu_to_le64(page_idx);
+	memset(iv.padding, 0, sizeof(iv.padding));
+
+	/*
+	 * Do a AES-256 encryption on every page-index
+	 * to generate the IV.
+	 */
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(hib_crypto.essiv_tfm, (u8 *)&iv,
+								(u8 *)&iv);
+	sg_init_one(&src, inbuf, inlen);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf, outlen);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(hib_crypto.req_sk,
+				   &src, &dst, outlen, &iv);
+
+	if (encrypt)
+		ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(hib_crypto.req_sk);
+	else
+		ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(hib_crypto.req_sk);
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("%s %scrypt failed: %d\n", __func__,
+		       encrypt ? "en" : "de", ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Invoked across hibernate/restore. */
+static void crypto_save(void *buf)
+{
+	memcpy(buf, get_salt_ptr(), HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES);
+}
+
+static void crypto_restore(void *buf)
+{
+	memcpy(get_salt_ptr(), buf, HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES);
+}
+
+static int init_crypto_helper(void)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Symmetric encryption initialization. */
+	if (!hib_crypto.tfm_sk) {
+		hib_crypto.tfm_sk =
+			crypto_alloc_skcipher("xts(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+		if (IS_ERR(hib_crypto.tfm_sk)) {
+			pr_err("Failed to load transform for aes: %ld\n",
+				PTR_ERR(hib_crypto.tfm_sk));
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!hib_crypto.req_sk) {
+		hib_crypto.req_sk =
+			skcipher_request_alloc(hib_crypto.tfm_sk, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!hib_crypto.req_sk) {
+			pr_err("Failed to allocate request\n");
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto free_tfm_sk;
+		}
+	}
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(hib_crypto.req_sk, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+	/* Switch to the image key, and prepare for page en/decryption. */
+	ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(hib_crypto.tfm_sk, get_key_ptr(),
+				     HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Failed to set the image key. (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto free_req_sk;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+ free_req_sk:
+	skcipher_request_free(hib_crypto.req_sk);
+	hib_crypto.req_sk = NULL;
+ free_tfm_sk:
+	crypto_free_skcipher(hib_crypto.tfm_sk);
+	hib_crypto.tfm_sk = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void exit_crypto_helper(void)
+{
+	crypto_free_skcipher(hib_crypto.tfm_sk);
+	hib_crypto.tfm_sk = NULL;
+	skcipher_request_free(hib_crypto.req_sk);
+	hib_crypto.req_sk = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copied from init_essiv_generator().
+ * Using SHA256 to derive the key and
+ * save it.
+ */
+static int init_iv_generator(const u8 *raw_key, int keysize)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+	/* 1. IV generator initialization. */
+	if (!hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm) {
+		hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm)) {
+			pr_err("crypto_hibernate: error allocating SHA-256 transform for IV: %ld\n",
+					    PTR_ERR(hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm));
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!hib_crypto.essiv_tfm) {
+		hib_crypto.essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(hib_crypto.essiv_tfm)) {
+			pr_err("crypto_hibernate: error allocating cipher aes for IV generation: %ld\n",
+					PTR_ERR(hib_crypto.essiv_tfm));
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto free_essiv_hash;
+		}
+	}
+
+	{
+		/* 2. Using hash to generate the 256bits AES key */
+		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm);
+
+		desc->tfm = hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm;
+		desc->flags = 0;
+		ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, raw_key, keysize, salt);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("crypto_hibernate: error get digest for raw_key\n");
+			goto free_essiv_hash;
+		}
+	}
+	/* 3. Switch to the 256bits AES key for later IV generation. */
+	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(hib_crypto.essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
+
+ free_essiv_hash:
+	crypto_free_shash(hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm);
+	hib_crypto.essiv_hash_tfm = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Either invoked during hibernate or restore.
+ */
+static int crypto_init(bool suspend)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	pr_info("Prepared to %scrypt the image data.\n",
+		  suspend ? "en" : "de");
+	if (!hib_crypto.keys.user_key_valid) {
+		pr_err("Need to get user provided key first!(via ioctl)\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ret = init_crypto_helper();
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Failed to initialize basic crypto helpers. (%d)\n",
+			ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	ret = init_iv_generator(get_key_ptr(),
+				HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("Failed to init the iv generator. (%d)\n", ret);
+		goto out_helper;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("Key generated, waiting for data encryption/decrytion.\n");
+	return 0;
+
+ out_helper:
+	exit_crypto_helper();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* key/salt probing via ioctl. */
+dev_t crypto_dev;
+static struct class *crypto_dev_class;
+static struct cdev crypto_cdev;
+
+#define HIBERNATE_SALT_READ		_IOW('C', 3, struct hibernation_crypto_keys)
+#define HIBERNATE_KEY_WRITE		_IOW('C', 4, struct hibernation_crypto_keys)
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(crypto_mutex);
+
+static long crypto_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			 unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&crypto_mutex);
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case HIBERNATE_SALT_READ:
+		if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg,
+				 get_salt_ptr(),
+				 HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+		break;
+	case HIBERNATE_KEY_WRITE:
+		if (copy_from_user(get_key_ptr(),
+				   (void __user *)arg,
+				   HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+		hib_crypto.keys.user_key_valid = true;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&crypto_mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int crypto_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations crypto_fops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl	= crypto_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	.compat_ioctl	= crypto_ioctl,
+#endif
+	.open		= crypto_open,
+	.release	= crypto_release,
+	.llseek		= noop_llseek,
+};
+
+static inline void prepare_crypto_ioctl(void)
+{
+	/* generate the random salt */
+	get_random_bytes(get_salt_ptr(), HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES);
+	/* install the hibernation hooks */
+	set_hibernation_ops(&hib_crypto);
+}
+
+static int crypto_hibernate_init(void)
+{
+	if ((alloc_chrdev_region(&crypto_dev, 0, 1, "crypto")) < 0) {
+		pr_err("Cannot allocate major number for crypto hibernate.\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	cdev_init(&crypto_cdev, &crypto_fops);
+	crypto_cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+	crypto_cdev.ops = &crypto_fops;
+
+	if ((cdev_add(&crypto_cdev, crypto_dev, 1)) < 0) {
+		pr_err("Cannot add the crypto device.\n");
+		goto r_chrdev;
+	}
+
+	crypto_dev_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE,
+					"crypto_class");
+	if (crypto_dev_class == NULL) {
+		pr_err("Cannot create the crypto_class.\n");
+		goto r_cdev;
+	}
+
+	if ((device_create(crypto_dev_class, NULL, crypto_dev, NULL,
+					"crypto_hibernate")) == NULL){
+		pr_err("Cannot create the crypto device node.\n");
+		goto r_device;
+	}
+	prepare_crypto_ioctl();
+
+	return 0;
+
+ r_device:
+	class_destroy(crypto_dev_class);
+ r_cdev:
+	cdev_del(&crypto_cdev);
+ r_chrdev:
+	unregister_chrdev_region(crypto_dev, 1);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static void crypto_hibernate_exit(void)
+{
+	set_hibernation_ops(NULL);
+	device_destroy(crypto_dev_class, crypto_dev);
+	class_destroy(crypto_dev_class);
+	cdev_del(&crypto_cdev);
+	unregister_chrdev_region(crypto_dev, 1);
+}
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Hibernatin crypto facility");
+
+module_init(crypto_hibernate_init);
+module_exit(crypto_hibernate_exit);
diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 9e58bdc..660aac3 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -69,6 +69,43 @@ extern void enable_restore_image_protection(void);
 static inline void enable_restore_image_protection(void) {}
 #endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX */
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HIBERNATION)
+#define HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES	16
+#define HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES	64
+#define HIBERNATE_IV_SIZE	16
+#define TOTAL_USER_INFO_LEN	(HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES+HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES)
+
+struct hibernation_crypto_keys {
+	char derived_key[HIBERNATE_KEY_BYTES];
+	char salt[HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES];
+	bool user_key_valid;
+};
+
+struct hibernation_crypto {
+	/* For data encryption */
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm_sk;
+	struct skcipher_request *req_sk;
+
+	/* For IV generation */
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
+	struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
+
+	struct hibernation_crypto_keys keys;
+
+	int (*crypto_data)(const char *inbuf, int inlen,
+			   char *outbuf, int outlen,
+			   bool encrypt, int page_idx);
+	void (*save)(void *buf);
+	void (*restore)(void *buf);
+	int (*init)(bool suspend);
+};
+
+extern void set_hibernation_ops(struct hibernation_crypto *ops);
+
+#else
+#define HIBERNATE_SALT_BYTES	0
+#endif
+
 #else /* !CONFIG_HIBERNATION */
 
 static inline void hibernate_reserved_size_init(void) {}
-- 
2.7.4

Powered by blists - more mailing lists