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Message-Id: <20180621231534.32278-4-me@tobin.cc>
Date:   Fri, 22 Jun 2018 09:15:33 +1000
From:   "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To:     Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc:     "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key

Currently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before
hashed pointers can be printed.  We can remove this wait by using the
hw RNG if available.

Use hw RNG to get keying material.

Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
---
 lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index a48aaa79d352..6c1fb395bddf 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1675,8 +1675,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
 
 static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
 {
-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Use hw RNG if available. */
+	if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
+		static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
+		return 0;
+	}
 
+	ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
 	if (!ret) {
 		return 0;
 	} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
-- 
2.17.1

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