linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] rusage: allow 64-bit times ru_utime/ru

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Message-ID: <20180625091426.GA18351@gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 25 Jun 2018 11:14:26 +0200
From:   Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        y2038 Mailman List <y2038@...ts.linaro.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Eggert <eggert@...ucla.edu>,
        Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
        Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@...assic.park.msu.ru>,
        Matt Turner <mattst88@...il.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org,
        Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] rusage: allow 64-bit times ru_utime/ru_stime


* Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:

> Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> writes:
> 
> > * Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> >
> >> The trouble with attributes is that means you can't filter your system
> >> call arguments with seccomp. [...]
> >
> > There's nothing keeping seccomp from securely fetching those arguments and 
> > extending filtering to them as well ...
> >
> > Allowing that would make sense for a lot of other system calls as
> > well.
> 
> Possibly.  The challenge is that if the fetch for the kernel to use
> those arguments is different from the fetch of seccomp to test those
> arguments you have a time of test vs time of use race.

Those fetched values should obviously then be used to call permitted system calls.

> Given the location of the seccomp hook at the kernel user space border
> there is no easy way for seccomp to share the fetch with the system
> call itself.
> 
> So I don't see how seccomp could perform the fetch securely.

Looks like more of a seccomp mis-design/mis-implementation than some fundamental 
problem.

Mis-designed security features should not hinder system call design.

Thanks,

	Ingo