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Message-ID: <20180625235505.GA22661@beast>
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 16:55:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Dave Watson <davejwatson@...com>
Cc: Boris Pismenny <borisp@...lanox.com>,
Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@...lanox.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net-next] net/tls: Remove VLA usage on nonce
It looks like the prior VLA removal, commit b16520f7493d ("net/tls: Remove
VLA usage"), and a new VLA addition, commit c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path
for ktls"), passed in the night. This removes the newly added VLA, which
happens to have its bounds based on the same max value.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index f127fac88acf..3e0b64549552 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- char header[tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size];
+ char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
size_t cipher_overhead;
size_t data_len = 0;
@@ -951,6 +951,12 @@ static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > skb->len)
return 0;
+ /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
+ if (WARN_ON(tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto read_failure;
+ }
+
/* Linearize header to local buffer */
ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
@@ -1111,7 +1117,7 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
}
/* Sanity-check the IV size for stack allocations. */
- if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) {
+ if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_priv;
}
--
2.17.1
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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