linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement

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Message-ID: <CAG48ez2puLWrDDPg=ighCY+yxFoP-nN97MqVseqYabBad+eKmg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 26 Jun 2018 04:46:08 +0200
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     yu-cheng.yu@...el.com
Cc:     kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, hjl.tools@...il.com,
        vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com, ravi.v.shankar@...el.com,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3)

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 4:45 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>
> This series introduces CET - Shadow stack
>
> At the high level, shadow stack is:
>
>         Allocated from a task's address space with vm_flags VM_SHSTK;
>         Its PTEs must be read-only and dirty;
>         Fixed sized, but the default size can be changed by sys admin.
>
> For a forked child, the shadow stack is duplicated when the next
> shadow stack access takes place.
>
> For a pthread child, a new shadow stack is allocated.
>
> The signal handler uses the same shadow stack as the main program.
>
> Yu-cheng Yu (10):
>   x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
>   x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction
>   x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack
>   x86/cet: Handle thread shadow stack
>   x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement
>   x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
>   mm: Prevent mprotect from changing shadow stack
>   mm: Prevent mremap of shadow stack
>   mm: Prevent madvise from changing shadow stack
>   mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of shadow stack

Shouldn't patches like these be CC'ed to linux-api@...r.kernel.org?