linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions

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Message-ID: <9d5d0cb7-5875-0814-835b-097db650b6a1@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date:   Tue, 26 Jun 2018 08:16:36 -0400
From:   Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:     Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov
Cc:     security@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked
 regions

On 06/25/2018 12:34 PM, Jann Horn wrote:
> If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace
> buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can
> stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held.
> 
> For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem
> to access anything that requires locking.
> 
> For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region.
> 
> For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access
> up above the locked region.
> 
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>

Only question I have is wrt the Fixes line, i.e. was this an issue until userfaultfd was introduced, and if not,
do we need it to be back-ported any further than the commit which introduced it.

Otherwise, you can add my
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>

> ---
>  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++--------------------
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index f3d374d2ca04..065f8cea84e3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -445,18 +445,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
>  	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
> -
>  	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>  			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
>  			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
>  	if (ret)
> -		goto out;
> +		return ret;
>  
> -	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
> -out:
> -	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
> -	return ret;
> +	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
>  }
>  
>  static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> @@ -1188,25 +1183,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
>  	ret = -EINVAL;
>  	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
>  					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
> -		goto out;
> +		goto out_unlock;
>  
>  	ret = -ENOMEM;
>  	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!page)
> -		goto out;
> +		goto out_unlock;
>  
>  	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index);
>  	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
>  		ret = cur_enforcing;
> -		goto out;
> +		goto out_unlock;
>  	}
>  	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
>  			  fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
> -	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
> -out:
>  	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
> +	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
> +out_free:
>  	free_page((unsigned long)page);
>  	return ret;
> +
> +out_unlock:
> +	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
> +	goto out_free;
>  }
>  
>  static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
> @@ -1219,6 +1218,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
>  	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
>  	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
>  
> +	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/* No partial writes. */
> +	if (*ppos != 0)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> +	if (IS_ERR(page))
> +		return PTR_ERR(page);
> +
>  	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
>  
>  	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> @@ -1233,22 +1243,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
>  					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	length = -ENOMEM;
> -	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	/* No partial writes. */
> -	length = -EINVAL;
> -	if (*ppos != 0)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> -	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
> -		length = PTR_ERR(page);
> -		page = NULL;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
>  	length = -EINVAL;
>  	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
>  		goto out;
> @@ -1280,6 +1274,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
>  	ssize_t length;
>  	int new_value;
>  
> +	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	/* No partial writes. */
> +	if (*ppos != 0)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> +	if (IS_ERR(page))
> +		return PTR_ERR(page);
> +
>  	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
>  
>  	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> @@ -1289,22 +1294,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
>  	if (length)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	length = -ENOMEM;
> -	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	/* No partial writes. */
> -	length = -EINVAL;
> -	if (*ppos != 0)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
> -	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
> -		length = PTR_ERR(page);
> -		page = NULL;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
>  	length = -EINVAL;
>  	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
>  		goto out;
>