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Message-Id: <20180626153642.5587-2-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:36:39 +0100
From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@...ulin.net>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>,
x86@...nel.org
Subject: [RFC 1/4] perf: Move some access checks later in perf_event_open
From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...el.com>
To enable per-PMU access controls in a following patch first move all call
sites of perf_paranoid_kernel() to after the event has been created.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...el.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org
---
kernel/events/core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index f490caca9aa4..12de95b0472e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10189,10 +10189,6 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
*/
attr->branch_sample_type = mask;
}
- /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
- if ((mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM)
- && perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
}
if (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) {
@@ -10409,11 +10405,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (err)
return err;
- if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
- if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
- }
-
if (attr.namespaces) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
@@ -10427,11 +10418,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
- if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
- perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
-
/*
* In cgroup mode, the pid argument is used to pass the fd
* opened to the cgroup directory in cgroupfs. The cpu argument
@@ -10501,6 +10487,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_cred;
}
+ if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
+ if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto err_alloc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
+ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) &&
+ perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto err_alloc;
+ }
+
+ /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
+ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) &&
+ (attr.branch_sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) &&
+ perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto err_alloc;
+ }
+
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
2.17.1
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