linux-kernel - Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v3 9/9] crypto: shash: Remove VLA usage in unaligned hashing

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Message-ID: <20180701172058.GA26715@sol.localdomain>
Date:   Sun, 1 Jul 2018 10:20:58 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@...el.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
        Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>,
        qat-linux@...el.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        dm-devel@...hat.com, linux-crypto <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        Lars Persson <larper@...s.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Alasdair Kergon <agk@...hat.com>,
        Rabin Vincent <rabinv@...s.com>
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v3 9/9] crypto: shash: Remove VLA usage in
 unaligned hashing

On Sun, Jul 01, 2018 at 10:04:59AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 30, 2018 at 12:03 AM, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 05:28:43PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> @@ -88,11 +81,13 @@ static int shash_update_unaligned(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> >>       unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
> >>       unsigned int unaligned_len = alignmask + 1 -
> >>                                    ((unsigned long)data & alignmask);
> >> -     u8 ubuf[shash_align_buffer_size(unaligned_len, alignmask)]
> >> -             __aligned_largest;
> >> +     u8 ubuf[MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1];
> >>       u8 *buf = PTR_ALIGN(&ubuf[0], alignmask + 1);
> >>       int err;
> >>
> >> +     if (WARN_ON(buf + unaligned_len > ubuf + sizeof(ubuf)))
> >> +             return -EINVAL;
> >> +
> >
> > How is 'ubuf' guaranteed to be large enough?  You removed the __aligned
> > attribute, so 'ubuf' can have any alignment.  So the aligned pointer 'buf' may
> > be as high as '&ubuf[alignmask]'.  Then, up to 'alignmask' bytes of data will be
> > copied into 'buf'... resulting in up to '2 * alignmask' bytes needed in 'ubuf'.
> > But you've only guaranteed 'alignmask + 1' bytes.
> 
> Hm, good point. Adding __aligned(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) looks to
> fix this, yes?
> 
> Also, if __aligned() is used here, can't PTR_ALIGN() be dropped? (I
> think you pointed this out earlier.)

Sure, I'm just not sure whether __aligned() with such a large alignment is
guaranteed to work on stack variables on all architectures.  See e.g.
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9507697/.

> 
> Also, is "unaligned_len" being calculated correctly? Let's say
> alignmask is 63. If data is binary ...111111, then unaligned_len will
> be 64 - 63 == 1, which is fine: we copy 1 byte out, bump the address
> by 1, and we're happily aligned to ...000000. If data is ...000000,
> then unaligned_len will be 64. But it should be 0. Shouldn't this be:
> 
> unsigned int unaligned_len;
> 
> unaligned_len = (unsigned long)data & alignmask;
> if (unaligned_len)
>     unaligned_len = alignmask + 1 - unaligned_len;
> 
> And then ubuf only needs to be MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK, without the +1?

shash_update_unaligned() is only called when 'data & alignmask'.
Similarly with shash_final_unaligned().

Though, calculating 'unaligned_len' could be simplified to

	unsigned int unaligned_len = -(unsigned long)data & alignmask;

which works either way.

- Eric