linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4.17 154/220] UBIFS: Fix potential integer overflow in allocation

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Message-ID: <CAFLxGvwxDRMUoJH-3NKefXS6YxL62DjxRDd-5e_ui5jjJAJiJQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 1 Jul 2018 20:48:07 +0200
From:   Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@...il.com>
To:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.17 154/220] UBIFS: Fix potential integer overflow in allocation

On Sun, Jul 1, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 4.17-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
> ------------------
>
> From: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@...il.com>
>
> commit 353748a359f1821ee934afc579cf04572406b420 upstream.
>
> There is potential for the size and len fields in ubifs_data_node to be
> too large causing either a negative value for the length fields or an
> integer overflow leading to an incorrect memory allocation. Likewise,
> when the len field is small, an integer underflow may occur.
>
> Signed-off-by: Silvio Cesare <silvio.cesare@...il.com>
> Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

Guys, this patch was never on linux-mtd nor was I CC'ed.
I don't see it so super security critical which argues to bypass the
whole community review process.

Anyway, I don't like this patch for two reasons.
1. Instead of doing the kmalloc_array() dance, just check whether size
is 0 > and <= UBIFS_BLOCK_SIZE, in the caller.
2. It will not apply to most stable kernels since it targets the code
path with UBIFS encryption available.

-- 
Thanks,
//richard