linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking

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Message-ID: <175662bd-f979-ac5f-b78e-480608bdbf55@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 10 Jul 2018 16:24:41 -0700
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omiun.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error
 checking

On 07/10/2018 03:26 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> +	/*
> +	 * Verify X86_PF_SHSTK is within a shadow stack VMA.
> +	 * It is always an error if there is a shadow stack
> +	 * fault outside a shadow stack VMA.
> +	 */
> +	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
> +		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK))
> +			return 1;
> +		return 0;
> +	}

It turns out that a X86_PF_SHSTK just means that the processor faulted
while doing access to something it thinks should be a shadow-stack
virtual address.

But, we *can* have faults on shadow stack accesses for non-shadow-stack
reasons.

I think you need to remove the 'return 0' and let it fall through to the
other access checks that we might be failing.  If it's a shadow stack
access, it has to be a shadow stack VMA.  But, a shadow-stack access
fault to a shadow stack VMA isn't _necessarily_ OK.