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Message-ID: <22370.1531293761@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 11 Jul 2018 08:22:41 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
jannh@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 24/32] vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation [ver #9]
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> > sfd = fsopen("ext4", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
> > write(sfd, "s /dev/sdb1"); // note I'm ignoring write's length arg
>
> Imagine some malicious program passes sfd as stdout to a setuid
> program. That program gets persuaded to write "s /etc/shadow". What
> happens? You’re okay as long as *every single fs* gets it right, but that’s
> asking a lot.
Do note that you must already have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to be able to call fsopen().
David
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