linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active

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Message-ID: <CAKv+Gu_3kD+7O4oR9751VH2CsG=+NmBY-Gypc25LFo9eT6m3RQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 11 Jul 2018 12:00:00 +0200
From:   Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
To:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc:     "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        KVM devel mailing list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "# 4 . 15 . x" <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Access EFI MMIO data as unencrypted when SEV is active

On 3 July 2018 at 15:32, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
> SEV guest fails to update the UEFI runtime variables stored in the
> flash. commit 1379edd59673 ("x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted
> when SEV is active") unconditionally maps all the UEFI runtime data
> as 'encrypted' (C=1). When SEV is active the UEFI runtime data marked
> as EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO should be mapped as 'unencrypted' so that both
> guest and hypervisor can access the data.
>
> Fixes: 1379edd59673 (x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted ...)
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
> Cc: linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>
> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 4.15.x
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> index 77873ce..5f2eb32 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
> @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
>         if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
>                 flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
>
> -       if (sev_active())
> +       if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
>                 flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
>
>         pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;

Is it safe to only update this occurrence and not the one in
efi_runtime_update_mappings() ?