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Message-Id: <874BAC3E-390F-458F-A33F-986E89BB2987@amacapital.net>
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 13:25:58 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 24/32] vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation [ver #9]
> On Jul 12, 2018, at 1:23 PM, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Don't play games with override_creds. It's wrong.
>>
>> You have to use file->f_creds - no games, no garbage.
>
> You missed the point.
>
>
> My suggestion was to use override_creds() to impose the appropriate creds at
> the top, be that file->f_creds or fs_context->creds (they would be the same in
> any case).
I think it should be a new syscall and use current’s creds. No override needed.
> Btw, do we protect sysfs, debugfs, tracefs, procfs, etc. writes against
> splice? Some of the things in debugfs are really icky, allowing you to muck
> directly with hardware.
>
We try. It has been a perennial source of severe bugs.
This is part of why I’d like to see splice() be an opt in. Also, it’s a major step toward getting rid of set_fs().
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