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Date:   Mon, 16 Jul 2018 09:36:24 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@...cle.com>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "Srivatsa S. Bhat" <srivatsa@...il.mit.edu>,
        "Matt Helsley (VMware)" <matt.helsley@...il.com>,
        Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@...are.com>,
        Bo Gan <ganb@...are.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 19/43] x86/fpu: Add an XSTATE_OP() macro

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>

commit b74a0cf1b3db30173eefa00c411775d2b1697700 upstream

Add an XSTATE_OP() macro which contains the XSAVE* fault handling
and replace all non-alternatives users of xstate_fault() with
it.

This fixes also the buglet in copy_xregs_to_user() and
copy_user_to_xregs() where the inline asm didn't have @xstate as
memory reference and thus potentially causing unwanted
reordering of accesses to the extended state.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@...cle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1447932326-4371-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@...il.mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@...are.com>
Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@...are.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---

 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h |   68 ++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -238,6 +238,20 @@ static inline void copy_fxregs_to_kernel
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)		\
 	: [_err] "=r" (__err)
 
+#define XSTATE_OP(op, st, lmask, hmask, err)				\
+	asm volatile("1:" op "\n\t"					\
+		     "xor %[err], %[err]\n"				\
+		     "2:\n\t"						\
+		     ".pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n\t"			\
+		     "3: movl $-2,%[err]\n\t"				\
+		     "jmp 2b\n\t"					\
+		     ".popsection\n\t"					\
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 3b)				\
+		     : [err] "=r" (err)					\
+		     : "D" (st), "m" (*st), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask)	\
+		     : "memory")
+
+
 /*
  * This function is called only during boot time when x86 caps are not set
  * up and alternative can not be used yet.
@@ -247,22 +261,14 @@ static inline void copy_xregs_to_kernel_
 	u64 mask = -1;
 	u32 lmask = mask;
 	u32 hmask = mask >> 32;
-	int err = 0;
+	int err;
 
 	WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
-		asm volatile("1:"XSAVES"\n\t"
-			"2:\n\t"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			: "D" (xstate), "m" (*xstate), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "0" (err)
-			: "memory");
+	if (static_cpu_has_safe(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		XSTATE_OP(XSAVES, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
 	else
-		asm volatile("1:"XSAVE"\n\t"
-			"2:\n\t"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			: "D" (xstate), "m" (*xstate), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "0" (err)
-			: "memory");
+		XSTATE_OP(XSAVE, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
 
 	/* We should never fault when copying to a kernel buffer: */
 	WARN_ON_FPU(err);
@@ -277,22 +283,14 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_xregs_
 	u64 mask = -1;
 	u32 lmask = mask;
 	u32 hmask = mask >> 32;
-	int err = 0;
+	int err;
 
 	WARN_ON(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
-		asm volatile("1:"XRSTORS"\n\t"
-			"2:\n\t"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			: "D" (xstate), "m" (*xstate), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "0" (err)
-			: "memory");
+	if (static_cpu_has_safe(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
+		XSTATE_OP(XRSTORS, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
 	else
-		asm volatile("1:"XRSTOR"\n\t"
-			"2:\n\t"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			: "D" (xstate), "m" (*xstate), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "0" (err)
-			: "memory");
+		XSTATE_OP(XRSTOR, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
 
 	/* We should never fault when copying from a kernel buffer: */
 	WARN_ON_FPU(err);
@@ -389,12 +387,10 @@ static inline int copy_xregs_to_user(str
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	__asm__ __volatile__(ASM_STAC "\n"
-			     "1:"XSAVE"\n"
-			     "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			     : "D" (buf), "a" (-1), "d" (-1), "0" (err)
-			     : "memory");
+	stac();
+	XSTATE_OP(XSAVE, buf, -1, -1, err);
+	clac();
+
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -406,14 +402,12 @@ static inline int copy_user_to_xregs(str
 	struct xregs_state *xstate = ((__force struct xregs_state *)buf);
 	u32 lmask = mask;
 	u32 hmask = mask >> 32;
-	int err = 0;
+	int err;
+
+	stac();
+	XSTATE_OP(XRSTOR, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);
+	clac();
 
-	__asm__ __volatile__(ASM_STAC "\n"
-			     "1:"XRSTOR"\n"
-			     "2: " ASM_CLAC "\n"
-			     xstate_fault(err)
-			     : "D" (xstate), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask), "0" (err)
-			     : "memory");	/* memory required? */
 	return err;
 }
 


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