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Message-ID: <a3e84f8d-23c2-b9e3-6b44-225f53499d8b@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Mon, 16 Jul 2018 11:24:29 -0700
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "SMACK-discuss@...ts.01.org" <SMACK-discuss@...ts.01.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:     "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 18/22] LSM: Use multiple secids in security module
 interfaces

LSM: Use multiple secids in security module interfaces

This is the first of two parts required to change the
security module infrastructure from using a u32 to
identify extended security attributes to using a pointer
to a structure containing the information required for
the set of security modules involved. You can't put an
SELinux secid, a Smack secid and an AppArmor secid
all into a u32. They don't fit. Schemes that map a
single u32 into sets of u32s are frought with data
management issues and as a result are not suitable for
use in the variety of ways secids manifest themselves
in the Linux kernel.

This patch changes the interfaces to the security modules
to use a "struct secids" pointer where they used a u32
before. There are changes in networking code where the
layering isn't so clean as I would like it to be.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         | 38 +++++++-------
 include/linux/security.h          | 19 +++++++
 include/net/flow.h                |  5 +-
 include/net/netlabel.h            |  8 +--
 net/core/filter.c                 |  4 +-
 net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c             |  4 +-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c      |  4 +-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 29 ++++++-----
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c      |  4 +-
 net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h      |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c            |  7 +--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c             |  3 +-
 security/apparmor/audit.c         |  4 +-
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/secid.h |  5 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c           |  7 +--
 security/apparmor/secid.c         |  9 ++--
 security/security.c               | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 59 +++++++++++----------
 security/selinux/include/audit.h  |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h   |  9 ++--
 security/selinux/netlabel.c       |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c    | 10 ++--
 security/selinux/xfrm.c           | 25 +++++----
 security/smack/smack_access.c     |  4 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 76 +++++++++++++++------------
 security/smack/smackfs.c          | 14 +++--
 27 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 115e7cd89d88..7c321d11d994 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 					int flags);
 	int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 					size_t buffer_size);
-	void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+	void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid);
 	int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 	int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
 
@@ -1578,8 +1578,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				gfp_t gfp);
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
-	void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+	void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid);
+	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
 	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1590,7 +1590,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 	int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
-	void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+	void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid);
 	int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 	int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 	int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 
 	int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-	void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+	void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct secids *secid);
 
 	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
 	void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
@@ -1644,8 +1644,10 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
 	int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 	int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
-	int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+	int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+				u32 *seclen);
+	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+				struct secids *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
 	void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
@@ -1680,20 +1682,21 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 	int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
 					char __user *optval,
-					int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+					int __user *optlen, unsigned int len);
 	int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
-					struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+					struct sk_buff *skb,
+					struct secids *secid);
 	int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
 	void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
 	void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
-	void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+	void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, struct secids *secid);
 	void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
 	int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 					struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,
 				const struct request_sock *req);
 	void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-	int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid);
+	int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(struct secids *secid);
 	void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
 	void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
 	void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -1732,15 +1735,16 @@ union security_list_options {
 				struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
 	int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x,
 					struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
-					u32 secid);
+					const struct secids *secid);
 	void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
 	int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
-	int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid,
-					u8 dir);
+	int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+					struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir);
 	int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
 						struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 						const struct flowi *fl);
-	int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
+	int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *secid,
+					int ckall);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 
 	/* key management security hooks */
@@ -1757,8 +1761,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 				void **lsmrule);
 	int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
-	int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
-				struct audit_context *actx);
+	int (*audit_rule_match)(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+				void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx);
 	void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ea875e761d14..6e8e98237a79 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ enum lsm_event {
 	LSM_POLICY_CHANGE,
 };
 
+struct secids {
+	union {
+		u32 common;
+		u32 selinux;
+		u32 smack;
+		u32 apparmor;
+	};
+};
+
+static inline bool secid_valid(const struct secids *secids)
+{
+	return secids->common != 0;
+}
+
+static inline void secid_init(struct secids *secid)
+{
+	memset(secid, 0, sizeof(*secid));
+}
+
 /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
 extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 		       int cap, int audit);
diff --git a/include/net/flow.h b/include/net/flow.h
index 8ce21793094e..aa29d11bc3d7 100644
--- a/include/net/flow.h
+++ b/include/net/flow.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/socket.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <net/flow_dissector.h>
 #include <linux/uidgid.h>
 
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ struct flowi_common {
 #define FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC		0x01
 #define FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH		0x02
 #define FLOWI_FLAG_SKIP_NH_OIF		0x04
-	__u32	flowic_secid;
+	struct secids flowic_secid;
 	struct flowi_tunnel flowic_tun_key;
 	kuid_t  flowic_uid;
 };
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ static inline void flowi4_init_output(struct flowi4 *fl4, int oif,
 	fl4->flowi4_scope = scope;
 	fl4->flowi4_proto = proto;
 	fl4->flowi4_flags = flags;
-	fl4->flowi4_secid = 0;
+	secid_init(&fl4->flowi4_secid);
 	fl4->flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
 	fl4->flowi4_uid = uid;
 	fl4->daddr = daddr;
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 72d6435fc16c..51dacbb88886 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
 
 /* NetLabel audit information */
 struct netlbl_audit {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct secids secid;
 	kuid_t loginuid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 };
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {
 			struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;
 			u32 lvl;
 		} mls;
-		u32 secid;
+		struct secids secid;
 	} attr;
 };
 
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 				const void *addr,
 				const void *mask,
 				u16 family,
-				u32 secid,
+				struct secids *secid,
 				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info);
 int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net,
 				const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 					      const void *addr,
 					      const void *mask,
 					      u16 family,
-					      u32 secid,
+					      struct secids *secid,
 					      struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	return -ENOSYS;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index e7f12e9f598c..74cf4c829068 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -4128,7 +4128,7 @@ static int bpf_ipv4_fib_lookup(struct net *net, struct bpf_fib_lookup *params,
 		err = fib_table_lookup(tb, &fl4, &res, FIB_LOOKUP_NOREF);
 	} else {
 		fl4.flowi4_mark = 0;
-		fl4.flowi4_secid = 0;
+		secid_init(&fl4.flowi4_secid);
 		fl4.flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
 		fl4.flowi4_uid = sock_net_uid(net, NULL);
 
@@ -4230,7 +4230,7 @@ static int bpf_ipv6_fib_lookup(struct net *net, struct bpf_fib_lookup *params,
 		f6i = ipv6_stub->fib6_table_lookup(net, tb, oif, &fl6, strict);
 	} else {
 		fl6.flowi6_mark = 0;
-		fl6.flowi6_secid = 0;
+		secid_init(&fl6.flowi6_secid);
 		fl6.flowi6_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
 		fl6.flowi6_uid = sock_net_uid(net, NULL);
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
index 82178cc69c96..e17896a5a947 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 
 	buffer[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL;
 	buffer[1] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
-	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid;
+	*(u32 *)&buffer[2] = secattr->attr.secid.common;
 
 	return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN;
 }
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
 				 const unsigned char *tag,
 				 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
+	secattr->attr.secid.common = *(u32 *)&tag[2];
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index ea7c67050792..592ec7ba8822 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 				const void *addr,
 				const void *mask,
 				u16 family,
-				u32 secid,
+				struct secids *secid,
 				struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
 	u32 addr_len;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,
 
 	return netlbl_unlhsh_add(net,
 				 dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len,
-				 secid, audit_info);
+				 secid->common, audit_info);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index c070dfc0190a..92744f4791c4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {
 #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry(iter) \
 	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)
 struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct secids secid;
 
 	struct netlbl_af4list list;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {
 #define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry(iter) \
 	container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)
 struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct secids secid;
 
 	struct netlbl_af6list list;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)
 static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				   const struct in_addr *addr,
 				   const struct in_addr *mask,
-				   u32 secid)
+				   struct secids *secid)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr;
 	entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr;
 	entry->list.valid = 1;
-	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->secid = *secid;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	ret_val = netlbl_af4list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 				   const struct in6_addr *addr,
 				   const struct in6_addr *mask,
-				   u32 secid)
+				   struct secids *secid)
 {
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,
 	entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3] &= mask->s6_addr32[3];
 	entry->list.mask = *mask;
 	entry->list.valid = 1;
-	entry->secid = secid;
+	entry->secid = *secid;
 
 	spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
 	ret_val = netlbl_af6list_add(&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	char *secctx = NULL;
 	u32 secctx_len;
+	struct secids ids;
 
 	if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
 	    addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;
 		const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask;
 
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, secid);
+		ids.common = secid;
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(iface, addr4, mask4, &ids);
 		if (audit_buf != NULL)
 			netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
 						  dev_name,
@@ -434,7 +436,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
 		const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;
 		const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask;
 
-		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, secid);
+		ids.common = secid;
+		ret_val = netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(iface, addr6, mask6, &ids);
 		if (audit_buf != NULL)
 			netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1,
 						  dev_name,
@@ -508,7 +511,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.common,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
 			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -569,7 +572,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
 		if (dev != NULL)
 			dev_put(dev);
 		if (entry != NULL &&
-		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+		    security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid.common,
 					     &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 			audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
 			security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1124,7 +1127,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 		if (ret_val != 0)
 			goto list_cb_failure;
 
-		secid = addr4->secid;
+		secid = addr4->secid.common;
 	} else {
 		ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb,
 					   NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,
@@ -1138,7 +1141,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
 		if (ret_val != 0)
 			goto list_cb_failure;
 
-		secid = addr6->secid;
+		secid = addr6->secid.common;
 	}
 
 	ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
@@ -1543,7 +1546,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid.common);
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 2f328af91a52..415643011499 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
 			 audit_info->sessionid);
 
-	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
+	if (audit_info->secid.common != 0 &&
+	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid.common,
 				     &secctx,
 				     &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index 4a397cde1a48..782ee194fdbd 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 					    struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid);
+	security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid.common);
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index 5f48251c1319..63fa1ff1a71d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,8 @@ static int xfrm_policy_match(const struct xfrm_policy *pol,
 
 	match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
 	if (match)
-		ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security, fl->flowi_secid,
+		ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
+						  fl->flowi_secid.common,
 						  dir);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1182,7 +1183,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
 				goto out;
 			}
 			err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
-						      fl->flowi_secid,
+						      fl->flowi_secid.common,
 						      dir);
 			if (!err) {
 				if (!xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(pol))
@@ -2365,7 +2366,7 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
 		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 
 	afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl, reverse);
-	err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid);
+	err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid.common);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 8308281f3253..30086d2eaf6f 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,8 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
 		xfrm_init_tempstate(x, fl, tmpl, daddr, saddr, family);
 		memcpy(&x->mark, &pol->mark, sizeof(x->mark));
 
-		error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security, fl->flowi_secid);
+		error = security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, pol->security,
+						fl->flowi_secid.common);
 		if (error) {
 			x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
 			to_put = x;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index eeaddfe0c0fb..d67faf77d6c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,14 +225,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			struct audit_context *actx)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	int found = 0;
 
-	label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
+	label = aa_secid_to_label(sid->apparmor);
 
 	if (!label)
 		return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index b8c8b1066b0a..8042046eef90 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
 int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			struct audit_context *actx);
 
 #endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index dee6fa3b6081..81f29538e415 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ struct aa_label;
 #define AA_SECID_INVALID 0
 
 struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+			     struct secids *secid);
 void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b0bf6ffe6a97..b0200481c811 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -707,10 +707,10 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return;
 }
 
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
-	*secid = label->secid;
+	secid->apparmor = label->secid;
 	aa_put_label(label);
 }
 
@@ -1077,7 +1077,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
  * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
-					    struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+					    struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct secids *secid)
 
 {
 	/* TODO: requires secid support */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index f2f22d00db18..07a5024dd675 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -73,10 +73,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
 	return label;
 }
 
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid->apparmor);
 	int len;
 
 	AA_BUG(!secdata);
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+			     struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label;
 
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 				    seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(label))
 		return PTR_ERR(label);
-	*secid = label->secid;
+	secid->apparmor = label->secid;
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index eea36930f6f3..785cd38b1245 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	pr_info("LSM: sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	pr_info("LSM: superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	pr_info("LSM: task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
+	pr_info("LSM: secid size           = %zu\n", sizeof(struct secids));
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1249,7 +1250,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
-	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
 }
 
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
@@ -1459,14 +1463,20 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 
 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = 0;
+	call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
 
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = secid;
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, &ids);
 }
 
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
@@ -1525,8 +1535,11 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 
 void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = 0;
+	call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
 
@@ -1608,8 +1621,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = 0;
+	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
 }
 
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -1788,15 +1804,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = secid;
+	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &ids, secdata,
 				seclen);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+	int rc;
+
+	ids.common = 0;
+	rc = call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
+
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
 
@@ -1933,8 +1958,14 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
 
 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
-			     skb, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+			     skb, &ids);
+	*secid = ids.common;
+
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
@@ -2003,7 +2034,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
 
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = secid;
+	return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, &ids);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
 
@@ -2142,7 +2176,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = secid;
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, &ids);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
@@ -2158,7 +2195,10 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 
 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = fl_secid;
+	return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, &ids, dir);
 }
 
 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
@@ -2187,7 +2227,13 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 
 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
+	struct secids ids;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &ids, 1);
+	*secid = ids.common;
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
@@ -2257,7 +2303,10 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
 			      struct audit_context *actx)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+	struct secids ids;
+
+	ids.common = secid;
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &ids, field, op, lsmrule,
 				actx);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fcdf1ea3c438..c12c36f72258 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3426,15 +3426,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
 	return len;
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
-	*secid = isec->sid;
+	secid->selinux = isec->sid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
-	u32 sid;
+	struct secids sids;
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
 
@@ -3446,8 +3446,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 
 	tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
 	/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
-	selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
-	tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sids);
+	tsec->create_sid = sids.selinux;
 	*new = new_creds;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3864,28 +3864,28 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	*tsec = *old_tsec;
 }
 
-static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct secids *secid)
 {
-	*secid = cred_sid(c);
+	secid->selinux = cred_sid(c);
 }
 
 /*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
-static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			   sid, secid,
+			   sid, secid->selinux,
 			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
 			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
 			   NULL);
 	if (ret == 0) {
-		tsec->sid = secid;
+		tsec->sid = secid->selinux;
 		tsec->create_sid = 0;
 		tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
 		tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
@@ -3997,9 +3997,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
-static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
 {
-	*secid = task_sid(p);
+	secid->selinux = task_sid(p);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -5024,7 +5024,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb,
+					   struct secids *secid)
 {
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	u16 family;
@@ -5046,7 +5048,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 		selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
 
 out:
-	*secid = peer_secid;
+	secid->selinux = peer_secid;
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	return 0;
@@ -5083,14 +5085,14 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
 }
 
-static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	if (!sk)
-		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
+		secid->selinux = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
 	else {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
-		*secid = sksec->sid;
+		secid->selinux = sksec->sid;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -5323,7 +5325,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
 }
 
-static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(struct secids *secid)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
 	u32 tsid;
@@ -5332,8 +5334,8 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
 	tsid = __tsec->sid;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			    tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
-			    NULL);
+			    tsid, secid->selinux, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+			    PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
@@ -5349,7 +5351,7 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
 				      struct flowi *fl)
 {
-	fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
+	fl->flowi_secid.selinux = req->secid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
@@ -6174,10 +6176,11 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+				 struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
-	*secid = isec->sid;
+	secid->selinux = isec->sid;
 }
 
 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
@@ -6383,16 +6386,18 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
 }
 
-static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+				   u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid->selinux,
 				       secdata, seclen);
 }
 
-static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+				   struct secids *secid)
 {
 	return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
-				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+				       &secid->selinux, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..c9cadad5660e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
  *	-errno on failure.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
 			     struct audit_context *actx);
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index a0b465316292..99bac3ccfebd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			     struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
-				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+				     const struct secids *secid);
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+			       struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 				      const struct flowi *fl);
@@ -40,7 +42,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			      struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *sid,
+				int ckall);
 int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index c40914a157b7..efc87a76af72 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
 		return NULL;
 
 	if ((secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) &&
-	    (secattr->attr.secid == sid))
+	    (secattr->attr.secid.selinux == sid))
 		return secattr;
 
 	return NULL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 7f9c87b077f3..b79b5b2ddf59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3410,7 +3410,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct secids *sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			     struct audit_context *actx)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
@@ -3431,10 +3431,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid->selinux);
 	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
-			  sid);
+			  sid->selinux);
 		match = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -3609,7 +3609,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
-		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+		*sid = secattr->attr.secid.selinux;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		rc = -EIDRM;
 		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
@@ -3682,7 +3682,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
-	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+	secattr->attr.secid.selinux = sid;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
 	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
 	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8ffe7e1053c4..067dd8307a9b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -153,7 +153,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
  * rule.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+				struct secids *fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
 	int rc;
 
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			  fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+			  fl_secid->selinux, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
 	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
@@ -200,14 +201,14 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 
 	state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-	if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
+	if (fl->flowi_secid.selinux != state_sid)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
 	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
 	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
 	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
-			     fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+			     fl->flowi_secid.selinux, state_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
 			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
@@ -261,13 +262,14 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
  * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
  * incoming packet.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct secids *sid,
+				int ckall)
 {
 	if (skb == NULL) {
-		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		sid->selinux = SECSID_NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
-	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, &sid->selinux, ckall);
 }
 
 int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
@@ -344,7 +346,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
  * on a secid.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
-				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
+				     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+				     const struct secids *secid)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
@@ -354,10 +357,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	if (!polsec)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (secid == 0)
+	if (!secid_valid(secid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid->selinux, &ctx_str,
 				     &str_len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -370,7 +373,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 
 	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
 	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
-	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+	ctx->ctx_sid = secid->selinux;
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 489d49a20b47..1bbbd53de78b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -550,7 +550,9 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
 	skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
 	skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
 	skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
-		NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+		NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL |
+		NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
 	/*
 	 * If direct labeling works use it.
 	 * Otherwise use mapped labeling.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 2d1a3fba40eb..157c6a731305 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1471,11 +1471,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
  * @inode: inode to extract the info from
  * @secid: where result will be saved
  */
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1941,12 +1941,15 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
-	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+	int rc;
+
+	init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
 
-	/* cbs copy rule list */
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules,
+		GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel,
+					&old_tsp->smk_relabel, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1956,13 +1959,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
  */
-static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
@@ -1973,11 +1976,11 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
  *
  * Set the security data for a kernel service.
  */
-static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2063,11 +2066,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
  */
-static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
 
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3206,12 +3209,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
  * @ipp: the object permissions
  * @secid: where result will be saved
  */
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
 	struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
 
-	*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+	secid->smack = iskp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3724,7 +3727,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		/*
 		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
 		 */
-		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid.smack);
 	/*
 	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
 	 * for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -3857,7 +3860,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
 			break;
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
-		if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
+		if (skb)
 			skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
 		else
 			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
@@ -3928,7 +3931,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
  * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
  */
 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
-					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+					 struct sk_buff *skb,
+					 struct secids *secid)
 
 {
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -3956,9 +3960,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 		break;
 	case PF_INET:
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
-		s = skb->secmark;
-		if (s != 0)
-			break;
+		if (skb->secmark) {
+			s = skb->secmark;
+			if (s != 0)
+				break;
+		}
 #endif
 		/*
 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3979,7 +3985,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 #endif
 		break;
 	}
-	*secid = s;
+	secid->smack = s;
 	if (s == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	return 0;
@@ -4053,9 +4059,11 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
 	 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
 	 */
-	if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
-		skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
-		goto access_check;
+	if (skb) {
+		if (skb->secmark != 0) {
+			skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+			goto access_check;
+		}
 	}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
 
@@ -4326,8 +4334,8 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
  * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
  * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
-				  struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct secids *secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+				  void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
@@ -4340,7 +4348,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
 		return 0;
 
-	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	skp = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
 
 	/*
 	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
@@ -4380,9 +4388,10 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
  *
  * Exists for networking code.
  */
-static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct secids *secid, char **secdata,
+					u32 *seclen)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid->smack);
 
 	if (secdata)
 		*secdata = skp->smk_known;
@@ -4398,14 +4407,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
  *
  * Exists for audit and networking code.
  */
-static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
+					struct secids *secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
 
 	if (skp)
-		*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+		secid->smack = skp->smk_secid;
 	else
-		*secid = 0;
+		secid->smack = 0;
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 9d2dde608298..0a075c80abb4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 
 	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	nap->secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1165,6 +1165,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
 	__be32 nsa;
 	u32 temp_mask;
+	struct secids secid;
 
 	/*
 	 * Must have privilege.
@@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
 	 * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
 	 */
-	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+	if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL) {
+		secid_init(&secid);
+		secid.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid;
 		rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
 			&snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
-			snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+			&secid, &audit_info);
+	}
 
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = count;
@@ -2951,7 +2955,9 @@ static int __init smk_preset_netlabel(struct smack_known *skp)
 {
 	skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
 	skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
-		NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+		NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL |
+		NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+	skp->smk_netlabel.attr.secid.smack = skp->smk_secid;
 	return smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known,
 				&skp->smk_netlabel, strlen(skp->smk_known));
 }
-- 
2.17.1


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