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Message-ID: <5fea4183-d596-5776-d927-552847c52a87@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2018 16:11:57 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for
shadow stack
On 07/17/2018 04:03 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-07-13 at 11:26 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 07/11/2018 10:05 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>>>
>>> My understanding is that we don't want to follow write pte if the page
>>> is shared as read-only. For a SHSTK page, that is (R/O + DIRTY_SW),
>>> which means the SHSTK page has not been COW'ed. Is that right?
>> Let's look at the code again:
>>
>>>
>>> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
>>> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
>>> + bool shstk)
>>> {
>>> + bool pte_cowed = shstk ? is_shstk_pte(pte):pte_dirty(pte);
>>> +
>>> return pte_write(pte) ||
>>> - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
>>> + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_cowed);
>>> }
>> This is another case where the naming of pte_*() is biting us vs. the
>> perversion of the PTE bits. The lack of comments and explanation inthe
>> patch is compounding the confusion.
>>
>> We need to find a way to differentiate "someone can write to this PTE"
>> from "the write bit is set in this PTE".
>>
>> In this particular hunk, we need to make it clear that pte_write() is
>> *never* true for shadowstack PTEs. In other words, shadow stack VMAs
>> will (should?) never even *see* a pte_write() PTE.
>>
>> I think this is a case where you just need to bite the bullet and
>> bifurcate can_follow_write_pte(). Just separate the shadowstack and
>> non-shadowstack parts.
>
> In case I don't understand the exact issue.
> What about the following.
>
> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
> index fc5f98069f4e..45a0837b27f9 100644
> --- a/mm/gup.c
> +++ b/mm/gup.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
> ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
> }
>
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_shstk_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
> + is_shstk_pte(pte));
> +}
> +
> static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
> {
> @@ -105,9 +111,16 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> }
> if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
> goto no_page;
> - if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
> - pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
> - return NULL;
> + if (flags & FOLL_WRITE) {
> + if (is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
> + if (!can_follow_write_shstk_pte(pte, flags)) {
> + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> + } else if (!can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags) {
> + pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
> + return NULL;
> + }
That looks pretty horrible. :(
We need:
bool can_follow_write(vma, pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
{
if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
// vanilla case here
} else {
// shadowstack case here
}
}
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