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Message-ID: <1531944882.10738.1.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 13:14:42 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omiun.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/27] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for
shadow stack
On Tue, 2018-07-17 at 16:15 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 07/17/2018 04:03 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> >
> > We need to find a way to differentiate "someone can write to this PTE"
> > from "the write bit is set in this PTE".
> Please think about this:
>
> Should pte_write() tell us whether PTE.W=1, or should it tell us
> that *something* can write to the PTE, which would include
> PTE.W=0/D=1?
Is it better now?
Subject: [PATCH] mm: Modify can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
can_follow_write_pte/pmd look for the (RO & DIRTY) PTE/PMD to
verify a non-sharing RO page still exists after a broken COW.
However, a shadow stack PTE is always RO & DIRTY; it can be:
RO & DIRTY_HW - is_shstk_pte(pte) is true; or
RO & DIRTY_SW - the page is being shared.
Update these functions to check a non-sharing shadow stack page
still exists after the COW.
Also rename can_follow_write_pte/pmd() to can_follow_write() to
make their meaning clear; i.e. "Can we write to the page?", not
"Is the PTE writable?"
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
mm/gup.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
mm/huge_memory.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index fc5f98069f4e..316967996232 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -63,11 +63,41 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
/*
* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
* after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
+ *
+ * Background:
+ *
+ * When we force-write to a read-only page, the page fault
+ * handler copies the page and sets the new page's PTE to
+ * RO & DIRTY. This routine tells
+ *
+ * "Can we write to the page?"
+ *
+ * by checking:
+ *
+ * (1) The page has been copied, i.e. FOLL_COW is set;
+ * (2) The copy still exists and its PTE is RO & DIRTY.
+ *
+ * However, a shadow stack PTE is always RO & DIRTY; it can
+ * be:
+ *
+ * RO & DIRTY_HW: when is_shstk_pte(pte) is true; or
+ * RO & DIRTY_SW: when the page is being shared.
+ *
+ * To test a shadow stack's non-sharing page still exists,
+ * we verify that the new page's PTE is_shstk_pte(pte).
*/
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
- return pte_write(pte) ||
- ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+ if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
+ if (pte_write(pte))
+ return true;
+ return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+ pte_dirty(pte));
+ } else {
+ return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+ is_shstk_pte(pte));
+ }
}
static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -105,7 +135,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
- if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+ if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write(pte, flags, vma)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 7f3e11d3b64a..822a563678b5 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1388,11 +1388,20 @@ int do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
/*
* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
* after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
+ * See comments in mm/gup.c, can_follow_write().
*/
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
-{
- return pmd_write(pmd) ||
- ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (!is_shstk_mapping(vma->vm_flags)) {
+ if (pmd_write(pmd))
+ return true;
+ return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+ pmd_dirty(pmd));
+ } else {
+ return ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+ is_shstk_pmd(pmd));
+ }
}
struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1405,7 +1414,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
- if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+ if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write(*pmd, flags, vma))
goto out;
/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
--
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