linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1

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Message-Id: <20180719.053143.44724954500843075.davem@davemloft.net>
Date:   Thu, 19 Jul 2018 05:31:43 +0900 (KST)
From:   David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To:     gustavo@...eddedor.com
Cc:     santosh@...lsio.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2018 20:59:58 -0500

> t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> 
> drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
> warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
> adapter->msix_info
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>

Applied, thanks.