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Message-ID: <20180719073240.autom4g4cdm3jgd6@kshutemo-mobl1>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:32:40 +0300
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 03/19] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs
On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 10:38:27AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 07/17/2018 04:20 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > Pages encrypted with different encryption keys are not allowed to be
> > merged by KSM. Otherwise it would cross security boundary.
>
> Let's say I'm using plain AES (not AES-XTS). I use the same key in two
> keyid slots. I map a page with the first keyid and another with the
> other keyid.
>
> Won't they have the same cipertext? Why shouldn't we KSM them?
We compare plain text, not ciphertext. And for good reason.
Comparing ciphertext would only make KSM successful for AES-ECB that
doesn't dependent on physical address of the page.
MKTME only supports AES-XTS (no plans to support AES-ECB). It effectively
disables KSM if we go with comparing ciphertext.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
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