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Message-Id: <20180720121422.364866651@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 20 Jul 2018 14:14:25 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Julien Grall <julien.grall@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 81/92] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>

commit a725e3dda1813ed306734823ac4c65ca04e38500 upstream.

As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the
discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation.

A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a
config option.

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@....com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@....com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig               |    9 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h |    3 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c   |   69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -849,6 +849,15 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config ARM64_SSBD
+	bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
+	default y
+	help
+	  This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
+	  by speculative loads.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
 menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
 	bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
 	depends on COMPAT
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@
 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0		23
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
 #define ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT		25
+#define ARM64_SSBD				26
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				26
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				27
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -252,6 +252,67 @@ void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(s
 
 	*updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn);
 }
+
+static void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
+{
+	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL);
+		break;
+
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state, NULL);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
+				    int scope)
+{
+	struct arm_smccc_res res;
+	bool supported = true;
+
+	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+
+	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * The probe function return value is either negative
+	 * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
+	 * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
+	 * last case.
+	 */
+	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
+		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+			supported = false;
+		break;
+
+	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
+		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+			supported = false;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		supported = false;
+	}
+
+	if (supported) {
+		__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
+		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
+	}
+
+	return supported;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
 #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max) \
@@ -452,6 +513,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		.enable = enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
+	{
+		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
+		.def_scope = SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU,
+		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
+		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
+	},
+#endif
 	{
 	}
 };


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