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Message-ID: <20180723170637.GA19396@embeddedor.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2018 12:06:37 -0500
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
To: Sathya Prakash <sathya.prakash@...adcom.com>,
Chaitra P B <chaitra.basappa@...adcom.com>,
Suganath Prabu Subramani
<suganath-prabu.subramani@...adcom.com>
Cc: MPT-FusionLinux.pdl@...adcom.com, linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mptfusion: Fix potential Spectre v1
port can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:1360 mptctl_getiocinfo() warn:
potential spectre issue 'ioc->pfacts'
Fix this by sanitizing port before using it to index ioc->pfacts
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
---
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
index 4470630..6751a40 100644
--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
+++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
#include <scsi/scsi_host.h>
#include <scsi/scsi_tcq.h>
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 1999-2008 LSI Corporation"
#define MODULEAUTHOR "LSI Corporation"
#include "mptbase.h"
@@ -1306,7 +1309,7 @@ mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size)
kfree(karg);
return -EINVAL;
}
- port = karg->hdr.port;
+ port = array_index_nospec(karg->hdr.port, 2);
karg->port = port;
pdev = (struct pci_dev *) ioc->pcidev;
--
2.7.4
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