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Message-ID: <1532432457.17797.8.camel@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 13:40:57 +0200
From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>
To: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Denis Kenzior <denkenz@...il.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Kookoo Gu <kookoo.gu@...el.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
Rui Zhang <rui.zhang@...el.com>, Theodore Ts o <tytso@....edu>,
Joey Lee <JLee@...e.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-pm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation
encryption
On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> Hi,
> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 01:42:36PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > On Fr, 2018-07-20 at 12:25 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel
> > > lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation
> > > can be enabled with kernel lockdown?
> >
> > OK, maybe I am dense, but if the key comes from user space, will that
> > be enough?
> >
>
> Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people
> suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the
> kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this
> should also be safe for encryption in kernel.
> https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html
> Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from
> user space.
It seems to me that your initial reasoning was correct and the key
should be generated in kernel space.
Regards
Oliver
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