linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container info of syscalls

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Message-ID: <20180726005129.vlwgj6bgnn2hufld@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date:   Wed, 25 Jul 2018 20:51:29 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc:     sgrubb@...hat.com, cgroups@...r.kernel.org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-audit@...hat.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, luto@...nel.org, carlos@...hat.com,
        dhowells@...hat.com, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, simo@...hat.com,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH ghak90 (was ghak32) V3 02/10] audit: log container
 info of syscalls

On 2018-07-23 14:31, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 12:48 PM Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, July 23, 2018 11:11:48 AM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > On 2018-07-23 09:19, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > > On Sunday, July 22, 2018 4:55:10 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > On 2018-07-22 09:32, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > > > > On Saturday, July 21, 2018 4:29:30 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > > > > > + * audit_log_contid - report container info
> > > > > > > > > + * @tsk: task to be recorded
> > > > > > > > > + * @context: task or local context for record
> > > > > > > > > + * @op: contid string description
> > > > > > > > > + */
> > > > > > > > > +int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk,
> > > > > > > > > +                            struct audit_context *context,
> > > > > > > > > char
> > > > > > > > > *op)
> > > > > > > > > +{
> > > > > > > > > +       struct audit_buffer *ab;
> > > > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > > > +       if (!audit_contid_set(tsk))
> > > > > > > > > +               return 0;
> > > > > > > > > +       /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */
> > > > > > > > > +       ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
> > > > > > > > > AUDIT_CONTAINER);
> > > > > > > > > +       if (!ab)
> > > > > > > > > +               return -ENOMEM;
> > > > > > > > > +       audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu",
> > > > > > > > > +                        op, audit_get_contid(tsk));
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Can you explain your reason for including an "op" field in this
> > > > > > > > record
> > > > > > > > type?  I've been looking at the rest of the patches in this
> > > > > > > > patchset
> > > > > > > > and it seems to be used more as an indicator of the record's
> > > > > > > > generating context rather than any sort of audit container ID
> > > > > > > > operation.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > "action" might work, but that's netfilter and numeric... "kind"?
> > > > > > > Nothing else really seems to fit from a field name, type or lack of
> > > > > > > searchability perspective.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Steve, do you have an opinion?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > We only have 1 sample event where we have op=task. What are the other
> > > > > > possible values?
> > > > >
> > > > > For the AUDIT_CONTAINER record we have op= "task", "target" (from the
> > > > > ptrace and signals patch), "tty".
> > > > >
> > > > > For the AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record we have "op=set".
> > > >
> > > > Since the purpose of this record is to log the container id, I think that
> > > > is all that is needed. We can get the context from the other records in
> > > > the event. I'd suggest dropping the "op" field.
> > >
> > > Ok, the information above it for two different audit container
> > > identifier records.  Which one should drop the "op=" field?  Both?  Or
> > > just the AUDIT_CONTAINER record?  The AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record (which
> > > might be renamed) could use it to distinguish a "set" record from a
> > > dropped audit container identifier that is no longer registered by any
> > > task or namespace.
> >
> > Neither of them need it. All they need to do is state the container that is
> > being acted upon.
> 
> I think we should keep the "op" field for audit container ID
> management operations, even though we really only have a "set"
> operation at the moment, but the others should drop the "op" field
> (see my previous emails in this thread).

In fact, I'd like to question the wisdom of dropping this field and
perhaps fine a better or new name for it, since these contid records
could be multiple and different from the primary task that is generating
this record.  In particular, there are extra contid records generated by
the ptrace/signals patch that could be from other processes in other
containers that I mentioned in a branch thread that got dropped
including the auc_pids data and the target_pid also attached to the
primary task's audit context.

> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635