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Message-ID: <20180726112245.3c1bf91d@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 11:22:45 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, kernel-team@...roid.com,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses
On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com> wrote:
> Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security
> developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix.
>
> The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for
> stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such
> a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only
> one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs
> to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken.
>
> Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may
> be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases,
> to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria?
>
The patch breaks the code it touches. It makes it useless. If you want
something for stable, add a command line parameter that just disables
the creation of that file. Otherwise you will break usespace and that
will be a definitely NAK from Linus, and for stable itself. This is a
very minor security issue, and does not justify breaking userspace
applications. I would be very upset if a new stable release broke both
perf and trace-cmd's ability to read certain trace events.
-- Steve
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