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Message-ID: <20180727094730.3a448629@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 09:47:30 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
salyzyn@...roid.com, kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, kernel-team@...roid.com,
stable@...r.kernel.org,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses
On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 15:40:32 +0200
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > But the code doesn't go to dmesg. It's only available
> > > via /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/printk_formats which is only available
> > > via root. Nobody else has access to that directory.
> > >
> > > -- Steve
> >
> > I think the point was that when we take capabilities into account the root
> > privileges aren't unequivocal anymore. The 'root' owned process with only
> > 'CAP_SYSLOG' shouldn't have access to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/printk_formats
>
> Then they shouldn't have access to debugfs at all, right?
That's what I'm thinking.
-- Steve
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