linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.17 273/336] crypto: authenc - dont leak pointers to authenc keys

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Message-Id: <20180801165039.481031989@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Wed,  1 Aug 2018 18:50:08 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org,
        Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.17 273/336] crypto: authenc - dont leak pointers to authenc keys

4.17-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tudor-Dan Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>

[ Upstream commit ad2fdcdf75d169e7a5aec6c7cb421c0bec8ec711 ]

In crypto_authenc_setkey we save pointers to the authenc keys in
a local variable of type struct crypto_authenc_keys and we don't
zeroize it after use. Fix this and don't leak pointers to the
authenc keys.

Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@...rochip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/authenc.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static int crypto_authenc_setkey(struct
 				       CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
 
 out:
+	memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys));
 	return err;
 
 badkey: