linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 16/16] arm64: kexec

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Message-ID: <20180801075720.GM11258@linaro.org>
Date:   Wed, 1 Aug 2018 16:57:21 +0900
From:   AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
To:     James Morse <james.morse@....com>
Cc:     catalin.marinas@....com, will.deacon@....com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        vgoyal@...hat.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
        davem@...emloft.net, dyoung@...hat.com, bhe@...hat.com,
        arnd@...db.de, schwidefsky@...ibm.com, heiko.carstens@...ibm.com,
        ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, bhsharma@...hat.com,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 16/16] arm64: kexec_file: add kaslr support

James,

All the changes mentioned below were applied to my coming v13.

On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 10:22:31AM +0100, James Morse wrote:
> Hi Akashi,
> 
> 
> On 07/27/2018 09:31 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> >On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 02:40:49PM +0100, James Morse wrote:
> >>On 24/07/18 07:57, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
> >>>Adding "kaslr-seed" to dtb enables triggering kaslr, or kernel virtual
> >>>address randomization, at secondary kernel boot.
> >>Hmm, there are three things that get moved by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE. The kernel
> >>physical placement when booted via the EFIstub, the kernel-text VAs and the
> >>location of memory in the linear-map region. Adding the kaslr-seed only does the
> >>last two.
> >Yes, but I think that I and Mark has agreed that "kaslr" meant
> >"virtual" randomisation, not including "physical" randomisation.
> Okay, I'll update my terminology!
> 
> 
> >>This means the physical placement of the new kernel is predictable from
> >>/proc/iomem ... but this also tells you the physical placement of the current
> >>kernel, so I don't think this is a problem.
> >>
> >>
> >>>We always do this as it will have no harm on kaslr-incapable kernel.
> >>>We don't have any "switch" to turn off this feature directly, but still
> >>>can suppress it by passing "nokaslr" as a kernel boot argument.
> >>
> >>>diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
> >>>index 7356da5a53d5..47a4fbd0dc34 100644
> >>>--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
> >>>+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
> >>>@@ -158,6 +160,12 @@ static int setup_dtb(struct kimage *image,
> >>Don't you need to reserve some space in the area you vmalloc()d for the DT?
> >No, I don't think so.
> >All the data to be loaded are temporarily saved in kexec buffers,
> >which will eventually be copied to target locations in machine_kexec
> >(arm64_relocate_new_kernel, which, unlike its name, will handle
> >not only kernel but also other data as well).
> 
> I think we're speaking at cross purposes. Don't you need:
> 
> | buf_size += fdt_prop_len("kaslr―seed", sizeof(u64));
> 
> 
> You can't assume the existing DTB had a kaslr-seed property, and the
> difference may take us over a PAGE_SIZE boundary.

I see, I will add that.

> 
> >
> >>
> >>>+	/* add kaslr-seed */
> >>>+	get_random_bytes(&value, sizeof(value));
> >>What happens if the crng isn't ready?
> >>
> >>It looks like this will print a warning that these random-bytes aren't really up
> >>to standard, but the new kernel doesn't know this happened.
> >>
> >>crng_ready() isn't exposed, all we could do now is
> >>wait_for_random_bytes(), but that may wait forever because we do this
> >>unconditionally.
> >>
> >>I'd prefer to leave this feature until we can check crng_ready(), and skip
> >>adding a dodgy-seed if its not-ready. This avoids polluting the next-kernel's
> >>entropy pool.
> >OK. I would try to follow the same way as Bhupesh's userspace patch
> >does for kaslr-seed:
> >http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2018-April/020564.html
> 
> (I really don't understand this 'copying code from user-space' that happens
> with kexec_file_load)
> 
> 
> >   if (not found kaslr-seed in 1st kernel's dtb)
> >      don't care; go ahead
> 
> Don' t bother. As you say in the commit-message its harmless if the new
> kernel doesn't support it.
> Always having this would let you use kexec_file_load as a bootloader that
> can get the crng to
> provide decent entropy even if the platform bootloader can't.

OK, but anyway previous "kaslr-seed" will be dropped first.

> 
> >   else
> >      if (current kaslr-seed != 0)
> >         error
> 
> Don't bother. If this happens its a bug in another part of the kernel that
> doesn't affect this one. We aren't second-guessing the file-system when we
> read the kernel-fd, lets keep this simple.

OK

> >      if (crng_ready()) ; FIXME, it's a local macro
> >         get_random_bytes(non-blocking)
> >         set new kaslr-seed
> >      else
> >         error
> error? Something like pr_warn_once().

It was changed to pr_notice() since there is nothing wrong.

Thanks,
-Takahiro AKASHI

> I thought the kaslr-seed was added to the entropy pool, but now I look again
> I see its a separate EFI table. So the new kernel will add the same entropy
> ... that doesn't sound clever. (I can't see where its zero'd or
> re-initialised)
> 
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> James