linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 0/4] Virtio uses DMA API for all devices

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Message-ID: <20180802200646-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Thu, 2 Aug 2018 20:19:41 +0300
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>
Cc:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Anshuman Khandual <khandual@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        aik@...abs.ru, robh@...nel.org, joe@...ches.com,
        elfring@...rs.sourceforge.net, david@...son.dropbear.id.au,
        jasowang@...hat.com, mpe@...erman.id.au, linuxram@...ibm.com,
        haren@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, paulus@...ba.org,
        srikar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, robin.murphy@....com,
        jean-philippe.brucker@....com, marc.zyngier@....com
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] Virtio uses DMA API for all devices

On Thu, Aug 02, 2018 at 11:01:26AM -0500, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-08-02 at 18:41 +0300, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > 
> > > I don't completely agree:
> > > 
> > > 1 - VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM is a property of the "other side", ie qemu
> > > for example. It indicates that the peer bypasses the normal platform
> > > iommu. The platform code in the guest has no real way to know that this
> > > is the case, this is a specific "feature" of the qemu implementation.
> > > 
> > > 2 - VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA (or whatever you want to call it), is a
> > > property of the guest platform itself (not qemu), there's no way the
> > > "peer" can advertize it via the virtio negociated flags. At least for
> > > us. I don't know for sure whether that would be workable for the ARM
> > > case. In our case, qemu has no idea at VM creation time that the VM
> > > will turn itself into a secure VM and thus will require bounce
> > > buffering for IOs (including virtio).
> > > 
> > > So unless we have another hook for the arch code to set
> > > VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA on selected (or all) virtio devices from the
> > > guest itself, I don't see that as a way to deal with it.
> > > 
> > > >  The other issue is VIRTIO_F_IO_BARRIER
> > > > which is very vaguely defined, and which needs a better definition.
> > > > And last but not least we'll need some text explaining the challenges
> > > > of hardware devices - I think VIRTIO_F_PLATFORM_DMA + VIRTIO_F_IO_BARRIER
> > > > is what would basically cover them, but a good description including
> > > > an explanation of why these matter.
> > > 
> > > Ben.
> > > 
> > 
> > So is it true that from qemu point of view there is nothing special
> > going on?  You pass in a PA, host writes there.
> 
> Yes, qemu doesn't see a different. It's the guest that will bounce the
> pages via a pool of "insecure" pages that qemu can access. Normal pages
> in a secure VM come from PAs that qemu cannot physically access.
> 
> Cheers,
> Ben.
> 

I see. So yes, given that device does not know or care, using
virtio features is an awkward fit.

So let's say as a quick fix for you maybe we could generalize the
xen_domain hack, instead of just checking xen_domain check some static
branch.  Then teach xen and others to enable that.
OK but problem then becomes this: if you do this and virtio device appears
behind a vIOMMU and it does not advertize the IOMMU flag, the
code will try to use the vIOMMU mappings and fail.

It does look like even with trick above, you need a special version of
DMA ops that does just swiotlb but not any of the other things DMA API
might do.

Thoughts?

-- 
MST