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Message-Id: <20180804082706.948729452@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2018 11:01:49 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Jeremy Cline <jcline@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 120/124] net: socket: fix potential spectre v1 gadget in socketcall
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeremy Cline <jcline@...hat.com>
commit c8e8cd579bb4265651df8223730105341e61a2d1 upstream.
'call' is a user-controlled value, so sanitize the array index after the
bounds check to avoid speculating past the bounds of the 'nargs' array.
Found with the help of Smatch:
net/socket.c:2508 __do_sys_socketcall() warn: potential spectre issue
'nargs' [r] (local cap)
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
net/socket.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -2324,6 +2325,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(socketcall, int, call, u
if (call < 1 || call > SYS_SENDMMSG)
return -EINVAL;
+ call = array_index_nospec(call, SYS_SENDMMSG + 1);
len = nargs[call];
if (len > sizeof(a))
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