linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption

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Date:   Tue, 7 Aug 2018 15:49:06 +0800
From:   Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@...il.com>
To:     Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
Cc:     oneukum@...e.com, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>, jlee@...e.com,
        "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, smueller@...onox.de,
        denkenz@...il.com, Linux PM list <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        kookoo.gu@...el.com, Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation encryption

On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 3:33 PM Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 12:20:20PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > On Mo, 2018-08-06 at 15:57 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > Hi Oliver,
> > > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote:
> > > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people
> > > > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the
> > > > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this
> > > > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel.
> > > > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html
> > > > > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from
> > > > > user space.
> > > >
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data
> > > > safe while the system is inoperative.
> > >
> > > Humm, I did not quite get the point here, let's take fscrypt
> >
> > While the system is running and the fs is mounted, your data
> > is as secure as root access to your machine, right? You encrypt
> > a disk primarily so data cannot be recovered (and altered) while
> > the system is not running.
> >
> > Secure Boot does not trust root fully. There is a cryptographic
> > chain of trust and user space is not part of it.
> >
> Okay, I see. So if we want to use secure boot mechanism for
> hibernation encryption, user space is trusted.
s/ is trusted/is not trusted/