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Message-ID: <CAEX_ruFp0KddnZyetZt997OvRzKDuN7U95MF_N9AgTh+mTcD7Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Aug 2018 11:21:04 +0100
From: Samuel Neves <samuel.c.p.neves@...il.com>
To: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@...gle.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, ebiggers@...nel.org,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Greg Kaiser <gkaiser@...gle.com>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
tomer.ashur@...t.kuleuven.be, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
"D. J. Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow
varying number of rounds
> The best attack on ChaCha breaks 7 rounds, and that attack requires 2^248 operations.
This number, as far as I can tell, comes from the "New features of
Latin dances" paper. There have been some minor improvements in the
intervening 10 years, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4], which pull back the
complexity of breaking ChaCha7 down to 2^235. In any case, every
attack so far appears to hit a wall at 8 rounds, with 12 rounds---the
recommended eSTREAM round number for Salsa20---seeming to offer a
reasonable security margin, still somewhat better than that of the
AES.
Best regards,
Samuel Neves
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/698
[2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/217
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1034
[4] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2017.04.034
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