linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 096/104] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry

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Message-Id: <20180814171521.340590481@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:17:50 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 096/104] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

commit 8e0b2b916662e09dd4d09e5271cdf214c6b80e62 upstream

Bit 3 of ARCH_CAPABILITIES tells a hypervisor that L1D flush on vmentry is
not needed.  Add a new value to enum vmx_l1d_flush_state, which is used
either if there is no L1TF bug at all, or if bit 3 is set in ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |    1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h       |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c               |   10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	(1 << 3)   /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
 						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
 						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
 	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND,
 	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS,
 	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED,
 };
 
 extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -731,6 +731,7 @@ static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]		= "conditional cache flushes",
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]		= "cache flushes",
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED]	= "EPT disabled",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]	= "flush not necessary"
 };
 
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -221,6 +221,16 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
+	       u64 msr;
+
+	       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+	       if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+		       l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		       return 0;
+	       }
+       }
+
 	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
 	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
 		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {