linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.4 18/43] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20180814171518.339016229@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:17:54 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 18/43] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>

commit fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346 upstream.

The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).

Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.

[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf

Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1807261308190.997@cbobk.fhfr.pm
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   38 +++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -309,23 +309,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 	return cmd;
 }
 
-/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
-static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
-{
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
-		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
-		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
-			return true;
-		}
-	}
-	return false;
-}
-
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -386,22 +369,15 @@ retpoline_auto:
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
-	 * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
-	 * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
-	 * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+	 * issues:
 	 *
-	 * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
-	 * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
-	 * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
-	 * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
-	 * switch is required.
+	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
 	 */
-	if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KAISER) &&
-	     !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-	}
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
 
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {