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Message-ID: <20180815155041.GA344@embeddedor.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 10:50:41 -0500
From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] misc: hmc6352: fix potential Spectre v1
val is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a
potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/misc/hmc6352.c:54 compass_store() warn: potential spectre issue
'map' [r]
Fix this by sanitizing val before using it to index map
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@...eddedor.com>
---
drivers/misc/hmc6352.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/hmc6352.c b/drivers/misc/hmc6352.c
index eeb7eef..38f90e1 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/hmc6352.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/hmc6352.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
static DEFINE_MUTEX(compass_mutex);
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ static int compass_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t count,
return ret;
if (val >= strlen(map))
return -EINVAL;
+ val = array_index_nospec(val, strlen(map));
mutex_lock(&compass_mutex);
ret = compass_command(c, map[val]);
mutex_unlock(&compass_mutex);
--
2.7.4
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