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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Yv9Bu4mJPOfkpxrom91kSKaUESHR-Tn1CAJCTTZy_8w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 13:56:33 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
linux-crypto <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] gcc-plugin updates for v4.19-rc1
On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 1:18 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> I absolutely refuse to take any hardening patches at all that have
> BUG() or panic() or similar machine-killing in it.
Okay, mental model adjusted. :) It was only "strong discouraged" until now.
> I thought VLA's were mostly gone.
Yes. Out of the ~115 instances we counted when we started with v4.16,
we've chipped away at them pretty steadily. Right now there are two
"one-off"s that haven't been picked up by maintainers:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=vla/leftovers
and the remaining series against crypto, for which I am waiting on
further review for Herbert. All the really odd-ball crypto cases have
been handled (and are up for the merge window for v4.19), but there's
still some minor changes that Herbert is examining:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=vla/crypto
And after that, there's a single patch to move -Wvla up into the
top-level Makefile:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10489873/
So, we're basically done, but the timing with the merge window wasn't
great since crypto continues to get tweaked and has taken much longer
than I had expected.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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