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Message-ID: <2872b945-60e7-b5d1-1f20-1ae6ecfd3967@sembritzki.me>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 23:31:27 +0200
From: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@...britzki.me>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with custom platform
keys to boot
On 15.08.2018 23:13, James Bottomley wrote:
> Consider a UEFI system for which a user has taken ownership, but which
> has some signed ROMs which are UEFI secure boot verified. Simply to
> get their system to boot the user will be forced to add the ODM key to
> the UEFI db ... and I'm sure in that situation the user wouldn't want
> to trust the ODM key further than booting.
I definitely agree with this point.
Is there any solution, except from building your own kernel, to the
scenario I described?
I think there should be.
(I've personally run into this with VirtualBox, which I IIRC couldn't
load, even though I provisioned my own PK, and signed both kernel and
VirtualBox module with my own key. I could've compiled my own kernel
with my //own key, but that is pretty impractical for most users.)
Yannik
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