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Message-ID: <20180818084400.GB31485@kroah.com>
Date:   Sat, 18 Aug 2018 10:44:00 +0200
From:   Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     lwn@....net, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: Re: Linux 4.9.121

diff --git a/Documentation/Changes b/Documentation/Changes
index 22797a15dc24..76d6dc0d3227 100644
--- a/Documentation/Changes
+++ b/Documentation/Changes
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ GNU C                  3.2              gcc --version
 GNU make               3.80             make --version
 binutils               2.12             ld -v
 util-linux             2.10o            fdformat --version
-module-init-tools      0.9.10           depmod -V
+kmod                   13               depmod -V
 e2fsprogs              1.41.4           e2fsck -V
 jfsutils               1.1.3            fsck.jfs -V
 reiserfsprogs          3.6.3            reiserfsck -V
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ is not build with ``CONFIG_KALLSYMS`` and you have no way to rebuild and
 reproduce the Oops with that option, then you can still decode that Oops
 with ksymoops.
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-A new module loader is now in the kernel that requires ``module-init-tools``
-to use.  It is backward compatible with the 2.4.x series kernels.
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 
@@ -363,16 +357,17 @@ Util-linux
 
 - <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>
 
+Kmod
+----
+
+- <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kmod/>
+- <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git>
+
 Ksymoops
 --------
 
 - <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/ksymoops/v2.4/>
 
-Module-Init-Tools
------------------
-
-- <ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/rusty/modules/>
-
 Mkinitrd
 --------
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index fea2fe577185..e54a126841a9 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 9
-SUBLEVEL = 120
+SUBLEVEL = 121
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Roaring Lionus
 
@@ -417,7 +417,8 @@ export MAKE AWK GENKSYMS INSTALLKERNEL PERL PYTHON UTS_MACHINE
 export HOSTCXX HOSTCXXFLAGS LDFLAGS_MODULE CHECK CHECKFLAGS
 
 export KBUILD_CPPFLAGS NOSTDINC_FLAGS LINUXINCLUDE OBJCOPYFLAGS LDFLAGS
-export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_UBSAN
+export KBUILD_CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL CFLAGS_MODULE
+export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE CFLAGS_UBSAN
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE
 export KBUILD_AFLAGS_KERNEL KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 4cd4862845cd..0a56898f8410 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -804,12 +804,12 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
+int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return pud_none(*pud);
 }
 
-int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
+int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return pmd_none(*pmd);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-mb/sha256_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-mb/sha256_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.S
index ec9bee661d50..b7f50427a3ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-mb/sha256_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-mb/sha256_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.S
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ ENTRY(sha256_mb_mgr_get_comp_job_avx2)
 	vpinsrd	$1, _args_digest+1*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm0, %xmm0
 	vpinsrd	$2, _args_digest+2*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm0, %xmm0
 	vpinsrd	$3, _args_digest+3*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm0, %xmm0
-	vmovd   _args_digest(state , idx, 4) , %xmm0
+	vmovd	_args_digest+4*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm1
 	vpinsrd	$1, _args_digest+5*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm1, %xmm1
 	vpinsrd	$2, _args_digest+6*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm1, %xmm1
 	vpinsrd	$3, _args_digest+7*32(state, idx, 4), %xmm1, %xmm1
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h
index bb078786a323..be6492c0deae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/i8259.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #define _ASM_X86_I8259_H
 
 #include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
 
 extern unsigned int cached_irq_mask;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5229eaf73828..ac67a76550bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -647,10 +647,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
-
+#endif
 enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
-#endif
 
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index a3b63e5a527c..e30baa8ad94f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -653,28 +653,50 @@ int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 /**
  * pud_free_pmd_page - Clear pud entry and free pmd page.
  * @pud: Pointer to a PUD.
+ * @addr: Virtual address associated with pud.
  *
- * Context: The pud range has been unmaped and TLB purged.
+ * Context: The pud range has been unmapped and TLB purged.
  * Return: 1 if clearing the entry succeeded. 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Callers must allow a single page allocation.
  */
-int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
+int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
 {
-	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pmd_t *pmd, *pmd_sv;
+	pte_t *pte;
 	int i;
 
 	if (pud_none(*pud))
 		return 1;
 
 	pmd = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(*pud);
+	pmd_sv = (pmd_t *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pmd_sv)
+		return 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++)
-		if (!pmd_free_pte_page(&pmd[i]))
-			return 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		pmd_sv[i] = pmd[i];
+		if (!pmd_none(pmd[i]))
+			pmd_clear(&pmd[i]);
+	}
 
 	pud_clear(pud);
+
+	/* INVLPG to clear all paging-structure caches */
+	flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE-1);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		if (!pmd_none(pmd_sv[i])) {
+			pte = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_sv[i]);
+			free_page((unsigned long)pte);
+		}
+	}
+
+	free_page((unsigned long)pmd_sv);
 	free_page((unsigned long)pmd);
 
 	return 1;
@@ -683,11 +705,12 @@ int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
 /**
  * pmd_free_pte_page - Clear pmd entry and free pte page.
  * @pmd: Pointer to a PMD.
+ * @addr: Virtual address associated with pmd.
  *
- * Context: The pmd range has been unmaped and TLB purged.
+ * Context: The pmd range has been unmapped and TLB purged.
  * Return: 1 if clearing the entry succeeded. 0 otherwise.
  */
-int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
+int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	pte_t *pte;
 
@@ -696,8 +719,30 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
 
 	pte = (pte_t *)pmd_page_vaddr(*pmd);
 	pmd_clear(pmd);
+
+	/* INVLPG to clear all paging-structure caches */
+	flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE-1);
+
 	free_page((unsigned long)pte);
 
 	return 1;
 }
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return pud_none(*pud);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disable free page handling on x86-PAE. This assures that ioremap()
+ * does not update sync'd pmd entries. See vmalloc_sync_one().
+ */
+int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return pmd_none(*pmd);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
diff --git a/crypto/ablkcipher.c b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
index d676fc59521a..860c9e5dfd7a 100644
--- a/crypto/ablkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
@@ -70,11 +70,9 @@ static inline u8 *ablkcipher_get_spot(u8 *start, unsigned int len)
 	return max(start, end_page);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
-						unsigned int bsize)
+static inline void ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
+					unsigned int n)
 {
-	unsigned int n = bsize;
-
 	for (;;) {
 		unsigned int len_this_page = scatterwalk_pagelen(&walk->out);
 
@@ -86,17 +84,13 @@ static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_slow(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
 		n -= len_this_page;
 		scatterwalk_start(&walk->out, sg_next(walk->out.sg));
 	}
-
-	return bsize;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
-						unsigned int n)
+static inline void ablkcipher_done_fast(struct ablkcipher_walk *walk,
+					unsigned int n)
 {
 	scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n);
 	scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n);
-
-	return n;
 }
 
 static int ablkcipher_walk_next(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
@@ -106,39 +100,40 @@ int ablkcipher_walk_done(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
 			 struct ablkcipher_walk *walk, int err)
 {
 	struct crypto_tfm *tfm = req->base.tfm;
-	unsigned int nbytes = 0;
+	unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */
+	bool more;
 
-	if (likely(err >= 0)) {
-		unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err;
+	if (unlikely(err < 0))
+		goto finish;
 
-		if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW)))
-			n = ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
-		else if (WARN_ON(err)) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto err;
-		} else
-			n = ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
+	n = walk->nbytes - err;
+	walk->total -= n;
+	more = (walk->total != 0);
 
-		nbytes = walk->total - n;
-		err = 0;
+	if (likely(!(walk->flags & ABLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) {
+		ablkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
+	} else {
+		if (WARN_ON(err)) {
+			/* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+		ablkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
 	}
 
-	scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
-	scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);
-
-err:
-	walk->total = nbytes;
-	walk->nbytes = nbytes;
+	scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more);
+	scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more);
 
-	if (nbytes) {
+	if (more) {
 		crypto_yield(req->base.flags);
 		return ablkcipher_walk_next(req, walk);
 	}
-
+	err = 0;
+finish:
+	walk->nbytes = 0;
 	if (walk->iv != req->info)
 		memcpy(req->info, walk->iv, tfm->crt_ablkcipher.ivsize);
 	kfree(walk->iv_buffer);
-
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ablkcipher_walk_done);
diff --git a/crypto/blkcipher.c b/crypto/blkcipher.c
index a832426820e8..27f98666763a 100644
--- a/crypto/blkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/blkcipher.c
@@ -70,19 +70,18 @@ static inline u8 *blkcipher_get_spot(u8 *start, unsigned int len)
 	return max(start, end_page);
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
-					       unsigned int bsize)
+static inline void blkcipher_done_slow(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
+				       unsigned int bsize)
 {
 	u8 *addr;
 
 	addr = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)walk->buffer, walk->alignmask + 1);
 	addr = blkcipher_get_spot(addr, bsize);
 	scatterwalk_copychunks(addr, &walk->out, bsize, 1);
-	return bsize;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
-					       unsigned int n)
+static inline void blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
+				       unsigned int n)
 {
 	if (walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_COPY) {
 		blkcipher_map_dst(walk);
@@ -96,49 +95,48 @@ static inline unsigned int blkcipher_done_fast(struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
 
 	scatterwalk_advance(&walk->in, n);
 	scatterwalk_advance(&walk->out, n);
-
-	return n;
 }
 
 int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 			struct blkcipher_walk *walk, int err)
 {
-	unsigned int nbytes = 0;
+	unsigned int n; /* bytes processed */
+	bool more;
 
-	if (likely(err >= 0)) {
-		unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err;
+	if (unlikely(err < 0))
+		goto finish;
 
-		if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW)))
-			n = blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
-		else if (WARN_ON(err)) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto err;
-		} else
-			n = blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
+	n = walk->nbytes - err;
+	walk->total -= n;
+	more = (walk->total != 0);
 
-		nbytes = walk->total - n;
-		err = 0;
+	if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW))) {
+		blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
+	} else {
+		if (WARN_ON(err)) {
+			/* unexpected case; didn't process all bytes */
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto finish;
+		}
+		blkcipher_done_slow(walk, n);
 	}
 
-	scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
-	scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);
+	scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, more);
+	scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, more);
 
-err:
-	walk->total = nbytes;
-	walk->nbytes = nbytes;
-
-	if (nbytes) {
+	if (more) {
 		crypto_yield(desc->flags);
 		return blkcipher_walk_next(desc, walk);
 	}
-
+	err = 0;
+finish:
+	walk->nbytes = 0;
 	if (walk->iv != desc->info)
 		memcpy(desc->info, walk->iv, walk->ivsize);
 	if (walk->buffer != walk->page)
 		kfree(walk->buffer);
 	if (walk->page)
 		free_page((unsigned long)walk->page);
-
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blkcipher_walk_done);
diff --git a/crypto/vmac.c b/crypto/vmac.c
index df76a816cfb2..bb2fc787d615 100644
--- a/crypto/vmac.c
+++ b/crypto/vmac.c
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 /*
- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
+ * VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing
+ *
+ * Reference: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krovetz-vmac-01
+ *
  * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
@@ -16,14 +20,15 @@
  * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
  */
 
-/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@....org) and Wei Dai.
- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
- * Please send bug reports to the authors.
- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*
+ * Derived from:
+ *	VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@....org) and Wei Dai.
+ *	This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
+ *	The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
+ *	Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
+ */
 
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -31,9 +36,35 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
-#include <crypto/vmac.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 
+/*
+ * User definable settings.
+ */
+#define VMAC_TAG_LEN	64
+#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE	128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256			*/
+#define VMAC_KEY_LEN	(VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
+#define VMAC_NHBYTES	128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
+
+/* per-transform (per-key) context */
+struct vmac_tfm_ctx {
+	struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
+	u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
+	u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
+	u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
+};
+
+/* per-request context */
+struct vmac_desc_ctx {
+	union {
+		u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES];	/* partial block */
+		__le64 partial_words[VMAC_NHBYTES / 8];
+	};
+	unsigned int partial_size;	/* size of the partial block */
+	bool first_block_processed;
+	u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];	/* running total of L2-hash */
+};
+
 /*
  * Constants and masks
  */
@@ -318,13 +349,6 @@ static void poly_step_func(u64 *ahi, u64 *alo,
 	} while (0)
 #endif
 
-static void vhash_abort(struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	ctx->polytmp[0] = ctx->polykey[0] ;
-	ctx->polytmp[1] = ctx->polykey[1] ;
-	ctx->first_block_processed = 0;
-}
-
 static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
 {
 	u64 rh, rl, t, z = 0;
@@ -364,280 +388,209 @@ static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
 	return rl;
 }
 
-static void vhash_update(const unsigned char *m,
-			unsigned int mbytes, /* Pos multiple of VMAC_NHBYTES */
-			struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
+/* L1 and L2-hash one or more VMAC_NHBYTES-byte blocks */
+static void vhash_blocks(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
+			 struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx,
+			 const __le64 *mptr, unsigned int blocks)
 {
-	u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
-	const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
-	int i;
-	u64 ch, cl;
-	u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
-	u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
-
-	if (!mbytes)
-		return;
-
-	BUG_ON(mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES);
-
-	mptr = (u64 *)m;
-	i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES;  /* Must be non-zero */
-
-	ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
-	cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
-
-	if (!ctx->first_block_processed) {
-		ctx->first_block_processed = 1;
+	const u64 *kptr = tctx->nhkey;
+	const u64 pkh = tctx->polykey[0];
+	const u64 pkl = tctx->polykey[1];
+	u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
+	u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
+	u64 rh, rl;
+
+	if (!dctx->first_block_processed) {
+		dctx->first_block_processed = true;
 		nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
 		rh &= m62;
 		ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
 		mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
-		i--;
+		blocks--;
 	}
 
-	while (i--) {
+	while (blocks--) {
 		nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
 		rh &= m62;
 		poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
 		mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
 	}
 
-	ctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
-	ctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
+	dctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
+	dctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
 }
 
-static u64 vhash(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
-			u64 *tagl, struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
+static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+		       const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
 {
-	u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
-	const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
-	int i, remaining;
-	u64 ch, cl;
-	u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
-	u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
-
-	mptr = (u64 *)m;
-	i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES;
-	remaining = mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES;
-
-	if (ctx->first_block_processed) {
-		ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
-		cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
-	} else if (i) {
-		nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, ch, cl);
-		ch &= m62;
-		ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
-		mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
-		i--;
-	} else if (remaining) {
-		nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), ch, cl);
-		ch &= m62;
-		ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
-		mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
-		goto do_l3;
-	} else {/* Empty String */
-		ch = pkh; cl = pkl;
-		goto do_l3;
-	}
-
-	while (i--) {
-		nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
-		rh &= m62;
-		poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
-		mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
-	}
-	if (remaining) {
-		nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), rh, rl);
-		rh &= m62;
-		poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
-	}
-
-do_l3:
-	vhash_abort(ctx);
-	remaining *= 8;
-	return l3hash(ch, cl, ctx->l3key[0], ctx->l3key[1], remaining);
-}
+	struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+	__be64 out[2];
+	u8 in[16] = { 0 };
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
 
-static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
-			const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl,
-			struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
-	u64 *in_n, *out_p;
-	u64 p, h;
-	int i;
-
-	in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce;
-	out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes;
-
-	i = n[15] & 1;
-	if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) {
-		in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n);
-		in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8);
-		((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE;
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
-			(unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n);
-
-		((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i);
+	if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
+		crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i);
-	h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
-	return le64_to_cpu(p + h);
-}
 
-static int vmac_set_key(unsigned char user_key[], struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
-	u64 in[2] = {0}, out[2];
-	unsigned i;
-	int err = 0;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, user_key, VMAC_KEY_LEN);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->cipher, key, keylen);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 	/* Fill nh key */
-	((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0x80;
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey)/8; i += 2) {
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
-			(unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
-		ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
-		ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
-		((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
+	in[0] = 0x80;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->nhkey); i += 2) {
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+		tctx->nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
+		tctx->nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
+		in[15]++;
 	}
 
 	/* Fill poly key */
-	((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xC0;
-	in[1] = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey)/8; i += 2) {
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
-			(unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
-		ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i] =
-			ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i] =
-				be64_to_cpup(out) & mpoly;
-		ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i+1] =
-			ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i+1] =
-				be64_to_cpup(out+1) & mpoly;
-		((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
+	in[0] = 0xC0;
+	in[15] = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->polykey); i += 2) {
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+		tctx->polykey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]) & mpoly;
+		tctx->polykey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]) & mpoly;
+		in[15]++;
 	}
 
 	/* Fill ip key */
-	((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xE0;
-	in[1] = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key)/8; i += 2) {
+	in[0] = 0xE0;
+	in[15] = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->l3key); i += 2) {
 		do {
-			crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
-				(unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
-			ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
-			ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
-			((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
-		} while (ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] >= p64
-			|| ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] >= p64);
+			crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
+			tctx->l3key[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
+			tctx->l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
+			in[15]++;
+		} while (tctx->l3key[i] >= p64 || tctx->l3key[i+1] >= p64);
 	}
 
-	/* Invalidate nonce/aes cache and reset other elements */
-	ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[0] = (u64)-1; /* Ensure illegal nonce */
-	ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[1] = (u64)0;  /* Ensure illegal nonce */
-	ctx->__vmac_ctx.first_block_processed = 0;
-
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
-		const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 {
-	struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
+	const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
 
-	if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
-		crypto_shash_set_flags(parent, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return vmac_set_key((u8 *)key, ctx);
-}
-
-static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc)
-{
+	dctx->partial_size = 0;
+	dctx->first_block_processed = false;
+	memcpy(dctx->polytmp, tctx->polykey, sizeof(dctx->polytmp));
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
-		unsigned int len)
+static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, unsigned int len)
 {
-	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
-	struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
-	int expand;
-	int min;
-
-	expand = VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size > 0 ?
-			VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size : 0;
-
-	min = len < expand ? len : expand;
-
-	memcpy(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, p, min);
-	ctx->partial_size += min;
-
-	if (len < expand)
-		return 0;
-
-	vhash_update(ctx->partial, VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
-	ctx->partial_size = 0;
-
-	len -= expand;
-	p += expand;
+	const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	unsigned int n;
+
+	if (dctx->partial_size) {
+		n = min(len, VMAC_NHBYTES - dctx->partial_size);
+		memcpy(&dctx->partial[dctx->partial_size], p, n);
+		dctx->partial_size += n;
+		p += n;
+		len -= n;
+		if (dctx->partial_size == VMAC_NHBYTES) {
+			vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, dctx->partial_words, 1);
+			dctx->partial_size = 0;
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (len % VMAC_NHBYTES) {
-		memcpy(ctx->partial, p + len - (len % VMAC_NHBYTES),
-			len % VMAC_NHBYTES);
-		ctx->partial_size = len % VMAC_NHBYTES;
+	if (len >= VMAC_NHBYTES) {
+		n = round_down(len, VMAC_NHBYTES);
+		/* TODO: 'p' may be misaligned here */
+		vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, (const __le64 *)p, n / VMAC_NHBYTES);
+		p += n;
+		len -= n;
 	}
 
-	vhash_update(p, len - len % VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
+	if (len) {
+		memcpy(dctx->partial, p, len);
+		dctx->partial_size = len;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *pdesc, u8 *out)
+static u64 vhash_final(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
+		       struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx)
 {
-	struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
-	struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
-	vmac_t mac;
-	u8 nonce[16] = {};
-
-	/* vmac() ends up accessing outside the array bounds that
-	 * we specify.  In appears to access up to the next 2-word
-	 * boundary.  We'll just be uber cautious and zero the
-	 * unwritten bytes in the buffer.
-	 */
-	if (ctx->partial_size) {
-		memset(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, 0,
-			VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size);
+	unsigned int partial = dctx->partial_size;
+	u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
+	u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
+
+	/* L1 and L2-hash the final block if needed */
+	if (partial) {
+		/* Zero-pad to next 128-bit boundary */
+		unsigned int n = round_up(partial, 16);
+		u64 rh, rl;
+
+		memset(&dctx->partial[partial], 0, n - partial);
+		nh_16(dctx->partial_words, tctx->nhkey, n / 8, rh, rl);
+		rh &= m62;
+		if (dctx->first_block_processed)
+			poly_step(ch, cl, tctx->polykey[0], tctx->polykey[1],
+				  rh, rl);
+		else
+			ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
 	}
-	mac = vmac(ctx->partial, ctx->partial_size, nonce, NULL, ctx);
-	memcpy(out, &mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
-	memzero_explicit(&mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
-	memset(&ctx->__vmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct vmac_ctx));
-	ctx->partial_size = 0;
+
+	/* L3-hash the 128-bit output of L2-hash */
+	return l3hash(ch, cl, tctx->l3key[0], tctx->l3key[1], partial * 8);
+}
+
+static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+	struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+	static const u8 nonce[16] = {}; /* TODO: this is insecure */
+	union {
+		u8 bytes[16];
+		__be64 pads[2];
+	} block;
+	int index;
+	u64 hash, pad;
+
+	/* Finish calculating the VHASH of the message */
+	hash = vhash_final(tctx, dctx);
+
+	/* Generate pseudorandom pad by encrypting the nonce */
+	memcpy(&block, nonce, 16);
+	index = block.bytes[15] & 1;
+	block.bytes[15] &= ~1;
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, block.bytes, block.bytes);
+	pad = be64_to_cpu(block.pads[index]);
+
+	/* The VMAC is the sum of VHASH and the pseudorandom pad */
+	put_unaligned_le64(hash + pad, out);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static int vmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
-	struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
 	struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
-	struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
 
 	cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
 	if (IS_ERR(cipher))
 		return PTR_ERR(cipher);
 
-	ctx->child = cipher;
+	tctx->cipher = cipher;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void vmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 {
-	struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
+	struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->cipher);
 }
 
 static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
@@ -655,6 +608,10 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	if (IS_ERR(alg))
 		return PTR_ERR(alg);
 
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (alg->cra_blocksize != 16)
+		goto out_put_alg;
+
 	inst = shash_alloc_instance("vmac", alg);
 	err = PTR_ERR(inst);
 	if (IS_ERR(inst))
@@ -670,11 +627,12 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
 
-	inst->alg.digestsize = sizeof(vmac_t);
-	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_ctx_t);
+	inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_tfm_ctx);
 	inst->alg.base.cra_init = vmac_init_tfm;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_exit = vmac_exit_tfm;
 
+	inst->alg.descsize = sizeof(struct vmac_desc_ctx);
+	inst->alg.digestsize = VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8;
 	inst->alg.init = vmac_init;
 	inst->alg.update = vmac_update;
 	inst->alg.final = vmac_final;
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
index 7aea28815d99..b51adffa4841 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ismt.c
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr,
 
 	/* unmap the data buffer */
 	if (dma_size != 0)
-		dma_unmap_single(&adap->dev, dma_addr, dma_size, dma_direction);
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, dma_addr, dma_size, dma_direction);
 
 	if (unlikely(!time_left)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "completion wait timed out\n");
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index a88ea9e37a25..0a4c2d4d9f8d 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -779,8 +779,8 @@ int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot);
 int pmd_set_huge(pmd_t *pmd, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot);
 int pud_clear_huge(pud_t *pud);
 int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd);
-int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud);
-int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd);
+int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr);
+int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr);
 #else	/* !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
 static inline int pud_set_huge(pud_t *pud, phys_addr_t addr, pgprot_t prot)
 {
@@ -798,11 +798,11 @@ static inline int pmd_clear_huge(pmd_t *pmd)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud)
+static inline int pud_free_pmd_page(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd)
+static inline int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/crypto/vmac.h b/include/crypto/vmac.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b700c7b2fe1..000000000000
--- a/include/crypto/vmac.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
- * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
- * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
- * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
- * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License for
- * more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
- * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
- * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
- */
-
-#ifndef __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
-#define __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
-
-/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk@....org) and Wei Dai.
- * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
- * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
- * Please send bug reports to the authors.
- * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
- * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-
-/*
- * User definable settings.
- */
-#define VMAC_TAG_LEN	64
-#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE	128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256			*/
-#define VMAC_KEY_LEN	(VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
-#define VMAC_NHBYTES	128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
-
-/*
- * This implementation uses u32 and u64 as names for unsigned 32-
- * and 64-bit integer types. These are defined in C99 stdint.h. The
- * following may need adaptation if you are not running a C99 or
- * Microsoft C environment.
- */
-struct vmac_ctx {
-	u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
-	u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
-	u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
-	u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
-	u64 cached_nonce[2];
-	u64 cached_aes[2];
-	int first_block_processed;
-};
-
-typedef u64 vmac_t;
-
-struct vmac_ctx_t {
-	struct crypto_cipher *child;
-	struct vmac_ctx __vmac_ctx;
-	u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES];	/* partial block */
-	int partial_size;		/* size of the partial block */
-};
-
-#endif /* __CRYPTO_VMAC_H */
diff --git a/lib/ioremap.c b/lib/ioremap.c
index 5323b59ca393..b9462037868d 100644
--- a/lib/ioremap.c
+++ b/lib/ioremap.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static inline int ioremap_pmd_range(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
 		if (ioremap_pmd_enabled() &&
 		    ((next - addr) == PMD_SIZE) &&
 		    IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr + addr, PMD_SIZE) &&
-		    pmd_free_pte_page(pmd)) {
+		    pmd_free_pte_page(pmd, addr)) {
 			if (pmd_set_huge(pmd, phys_addr + addr, prot))
 				continue;
 		}
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static inline int ioremap_pud_range(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
 		if (ioremap_pud_enabled() &&
 		    ((next - addr) == PUD_SIZE) &&
 		    IS_ALIGNED(phys_addr + addr, PUD_SIZE) &&
-		    pud_free_pmd_page(pud)) {
+		    pud_free_pmd_page(pud, addr)) {
 			if (pud_set_huge(pud, phys_addr + addr, prot))
 				continue;
 		}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
index 1fc076420d1e..1811f8e7ddf4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ static void hidp_del_timer(struct hidp_session *session)
 		del_timer(&session->timer);
 }
 
-static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session,
-				int type, const u8 *data, int len, int intr)
+static void hidp_process_report(struct hidp_session *session, int type,
+				const u8 *data, unsigned int len, int intr)
 {
 	if (len > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
 		len = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE;
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
index 37323b0df374..2624d4bf9a45 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan
@@ -28,4 +28,7 @@ else
         CFLAGS_KASAN := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_MINIMAL)
     endif
 endif
+
+CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin
+
 endif
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index ae0f9ab1a70d..c954040c3cf2 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_KASAN),y)
 _c_flags += $(if $(patsubst n%,, \
 		$(KASAN_SANITIZE_$(basetarget).o)$(KASAN_SANITIZE)y), \
-		$(CFLAGS_KASAN))
+		$(CFLAGS_KASAN), $(CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE))
 endif
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN),y)
diff --git a/scripts/depmod.sh b/scripts/depmod.sh
index 122599b1c13b..ea1e96921e3b 100755
--- a/scripts/depmod.sh
+++ b/scripts/depmod.sh
@@ -10,10 +10,16 @@ DEPMOD=$1
 KERNELRELEASE=$2
 SYMBOL_PREFIX=$3
 
-if ! test -r System.map -a -x "$DEPMOD"; then
+if ! test -r System.map ; then
 	exit 0
 fi
 
+if [ -z $(command -v $DEPMOD) ]; then
+	echo "'make modules_install' requires $DEPMOD. Please install it." >&2
+	echo "This is probably in the kmod package." >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
 # older versions of depmod don't support -P <symbol-prefix>
 # support was added in module-init-tools 3.13
 if test -n "$SYMBOL_PREFIX"; then
diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c b/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c
index cdcced9f32b6..b7c1e3d74ccc 100644
--- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c
+++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c
@@ -128,23 +128,19 @@ static int cht_codec_init(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *runtime)
 	struct cht_mc_private *ctx = snd_soc_card_get_drvdata(runtime->card);
 	struct snd_soc_jack *jack = &ctx->jack;
 
-	/**
-	* TI supports 4 butons headset detection
-	* KEY_MEDIA
-	* KEY_VOICECOMMAND
-	* KEY_VOLUMEUP
-	* KEY_VOLUMEDOWN
-	*/
-	if (ctx->ts3a227e_present)
-		jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE |
-					SND_JACK_BTN_0 | SND_JACK_BTN_1 |
-					SND_JACK_BTN_2 | SND_JACK_BTN_3;
-	else
-		jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE;
+	if (ctx->ts3a227e_present) {
+		/*
+		 * The jack has already been created in the
+		 * cht_max98090_headset_init() function.
+		 */
+		snd_soc_jack_notifier_register(jack, &cht_jack_nb);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE;
 
 	ret = snd_soc_card_jack_new(runtime->card, "Headset Jack",
 					jack_type, jack, NULL, 0);
-
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(runtime->dev, "Headset Jack creation failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
@@ -200,6 +196,27 @@ static int cht_max98090_headset_init(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 {
 	struct snd_soc_card *card = component->card;
 	struct cht_mc_private *ctx = snd_soc_card_get_drvdata(card);
+	struct snd_soc_jack *jack = &ctx->jack;
+	int jack_type;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * TI supports 4 butons headset detection
+	 * KEY_MEDIA
+	 * KEY_VOICECOMMAND
+	 * KEY_VOLUMEUP
+	 * KEY_VOLUMEDOWN
+	 */
+	jack_type = SND_JACK_HEADPHONE | SND_JACK_MICROPHONE |
+		    SND_JACK_BTN_0 | SND_JACK_BTN_1 |
+		    SND_JACK_BTN_2 | SND_JACK_BTN_3;
+
+	ret = snd_soc_card_jack_new(card, "Headset Jack", jack_type,
+				    jack, NULL, 0);
+	if (ret) {
+		dev_err(card->dev, "Headset Jack creation failed %d\n", ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
 
 	return ts3a227e_enable_jack_detect(component, &ctx->jack);
 }

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