linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v9 22/22] s390: doc: detailed specifications for AP virtualization

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Date:   Wed, 22 Aug 2018 12:09:39 +0200
From:   Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>
To:     Harald Freudenberger <freude@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, freude@...ibm.com, schwidefsky@...ibm.com,
        heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, borntraeger@...ibm.com,
        kwankhede@...dia.com, bjsdjshi@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, alex.williamson@...hat.com,
        pmorel@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, alifm@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        mjrosato@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, jjherne@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
        thuth@...hat.com, pasic@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@...hat.com,
        fiuczy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@...ibm.com,
        frankja@...ux.ibm.com, Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 22/22] s390: doc: detailed specifications for AP
 virtualization

On Wed, 22 Aug 2018 09:04:13 +0200
Harald Freudenberger <freude@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:

> Well, sooner or later this has to work. Yesterday we tested the control
> domain thing with trying to pull some simple data from a 'controlled' domain
> to the TKE - doesn't work with a Linux LPAR. I will investigate the details in the
> next weeks. However, long-term it should be possible to run scenarios
> like having one KVM guest control all the domains used by other KVM guests.
> With respect to the KVM vfio driver, currently there should be just the
> rule that for a guest the control domain mask should be equal or a superset
> of the usage domain mask. This is by convention as the architecture is
> not so clear here, but this is enforced on every place which deals with
> usage and control domains (SE, TKE).

Thanks for the update; this makes me think we really should fiddle with
the masks in the kernel (as opposed to doing it higher up in the stack).